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The Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape
The Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape is located at the far eastern edge of the tropical Pacific Ocean, 
to the south of Costa Rica and Panama, and to the west of Colombia and mainland Ecuador. The 
Seascape is naturally demarcated by the convergence of three tectonic plates. The region extends to 
the west as far as the Cocos Ridge, a long submarine mountain chain running from Costa Rica in the 
north, to the Galapagos Islands over 1,500 km to the southwest. Another chain, the Carnegie Ridge, 
which runs for 1,000 km, from the Galapagos Islands to the coast of Ecuador, denotes its southern 
limits. Within these limits lies the Panama Bight, with depths greater than 4,000 meters.
Marine currents in this region are complex, moving water from the Central American coast towards the 
Eastern Tropical Pacific, where it flows slowly to the west to join the North Equatorial Current. Another 
current affecting the region is the North Equatorial Countercurrent, which brings surface water to the east. 
The regional waters are warm (maximum temperatures of 28°C), but in some areas the temperature can 
drop to 25°C during periods of upwelling.
This Seascape boasts diverse endemic marine and terrestrial species, and displays a high degree of 
ecological connectivity. It possesses complex ecological relationships due to the dynamic convergence 
of marine currents that affect the migration and distribution of many species. The islands in the region 
are home to the most extensive coral reefs in the Eastern Tropical Pacific, and some of these coral 
species are endemic to the region. The Seascape is a migratory destination for several threatened and 
endangered species including the blue whale, humpback whale, and the leatherback turtle. Due to 
its biological productivity, the Eastern Tropical Pacific is of key importance for tuna fisheries (yellowfin, 
skipjack and bigeye).
The region is vulnerable to degradation as a result of the following human activities:
Illegal fishing.• 
Overexploitation of coastal marine resources.• 
Inadequately regulated tourism growth.• 
Risk of pollution from commercial vessels (marine transport).• 
Habitat loss and degradation.• 
Introduction of exotic species.• 
The region is periodically subjected to extreme climatic events (El Niño – Southern Oscillation), which have 
negative impacts on resident and migratory species (but sometimes provide new opportunities). 
In recognition of its high level of biodiversity, biological productivity and the ecological value of many sites 
in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape, each one of its four constituent nations has established marine 
protected areas (MPAs) within their respective waters.
In 1978, Costa Rice declared Cocos Island a National Park with 24 km• 2 of terrestrial area and 
1,974 km2 of marine area.
In Panama, Coiba National Park, with a terrestrial area of 537 km• 2 and a marine area of 2,165 
km2, has existed in its current form since 2004.
Colombia has two marine protected areas in the Pacific: the Malpelo Flora and Fauna Sanctuary • 
and the Gorgona Natural National Park, designated in 1995 and 1993 respectively. Malpelo includes 
3.5 km2 of terrestrial habitat and 8,572 km2 of marine area, whereas Gorgona includes 16 km2 of 
terrestrial habitat and 598 km2 of marine area. 
The Galapagos Marine Reserve, which covers an area approximately 133,000 km• 2, is the largest 
marine protected area in the region. The origin of the Galapagos Marine Reserve is the Special 
Law for the Conservation and Sustainable Development of the Province of Galapagos of 1998. It 
extends 40 nautical miles from a baseline around the farthest points of the Galapagos Archipelago.
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In recognition of their great ecological value, their value as endangered species habitats, and for 
their natural beauty, four of the five MPAs (with the exception of Gorgona) have been designated 
as UNESCO World Natural Heritage Sites. UNESCO first recognized Cocos Island National Park 
in 1997, then the Galapagos Marine Reserve in 2001, Coiba National Park in 2005, and Malpelo 
Flora and Fauna Sanctuary in 2006. All these islands and their surrounding ocean share certain 
features – their isolation from the mainland, their endemic species, and their relatively pristine 
state of protection and conservation.
In 2004, the governments of Costa Rica, Panama, Ecuador and Colombia signed an agreement to 
create the Eastern Tropical Pacific Marine Corridor (CMAR). The main objective of this agreement 
is the conservation and sustainable development of the 211 million hectare region which contains 
the aforementioned MPAs. The CMAR initiative is supported by the United Nations Environment 
Program (UNEP), UNESCO, Conservation International (CI), the IUCN among others. With over 
80 NGOs, research organizations, local community groups, and representatives from the private 
sector particpating, CI’s Eastern Tropical Pacific Seascape (ETPS) initiative has promoted regional 
cooperation for the training, education and conservation of marine resources.
Study Objectives
The main objective of this study is to identify and evaluate the critical factors required for effective law 
enforcement in each MPA of the Seascape. The specific objectives are:
To determine the main strengths and weaknesses of the law enforcement chain in each MPA.1. 
To prioritize a series of recommendations to improve the enforcement chain in each MPA.2. 
To identify regional initiatives to strengthen cooperation between member states; in partcular 3. 
regarding the conservation of migratory species. 
Introduction
Six years have passed since the ETPS initiative began supporting enforcement efforts in each of the 
MPAs. While considerable progress has been made, many Seascape MPA managers identified a 
number of common factors that continue to limit their effectiveness:
Insufficient legal framework and/or low implementation.• 
Overlapping or interfering jurisdiction between authorities.• 
Lack of coordination between authorities.• 
Lack of equipment and means.• 
Limited economic resources.• 
Low technical capacity of staff or insufficient personnel.• 
Lack of political will regarding conservation.• 
Institutional weakness in the government environmental sector.• 
Although there are strong commercial fishing links between the four Seascape countries, there is little 
collaboration on issues relating to environmental management. Vessels from these countries frequently 
operate illegally in waters belonging to their neighbour states. Recently, tourism vessels from one country 
have entered the MPAs of another country, which implies that the host nation must address the risk of 
species introduction, waste disposal management, and to consider the carrying capacities for visitor 
sites. Currently, legislation regarding these issues is minimal or non-existent. It is clear that not only are 
there shared weaknesses amongst the MPAs, but that their scarce resources are not being used in the 
most cost-effective and efficient manner. 
In order to strengthen the conservation of the core MPAs, it is essential to 
determine and evaluate the critical factors affecting law enforcement in each 
MPA. We developed a comprehensive investigative methodology that highlights 
the critical factors required for the successful application of law by focusing 
on the law enforcement chain. This chain encompasses the activities of patrolling, detection of a 
violation, detention of the violator, prosecution, and the sentencing of violators by judicial bodies or 
the relevant authority. It also includes an important preliminary stage – the education of users and 
stakeholders in regulations. 
An effective law enforcement system should dissuade potential lawbreakers from committing illegal 
activities as the consequences/risks associated with apprehension outweigh economic gain. The 
law enforcement chain requires that each link function in an effective manner and no one link is more 
important than the other. The chain is only as strong as its weakest link. One can possess a modern 
fleet that effectively patrols and intercepts vessels illegally fishing in a protected area, but if no effective 
prosecution or sanction exists, nothing will stop the same vessels from returning. Neither is it useful to 
have an effective legal system if personnel and vessels are not patrolling and intercepting poachers.
Law Enforcement Chain
Surveillance and Detection Interception and Arrest Prosecution Sanctions
Personnel Speed and vessel autonomy Speed and efficiency of adminis-
trative processes
Ratio of cases initiated versus 
sentences passed
Size and complexity of protected 
area
Boarding procedures and crime 
scene investigation
Speed and efficiency of judicial 
processes
Processing time
Vessels for patrolling and level of 
autonomy
Collection and management of 
evidence
Proportion of unresolved cases Sanctions implemented
Applied technology Detailed investigation of the crime 
scene
Ratio of cases submitted versus 
accepted
Vessel Availability Appropriate and timely reporting Case follow-up
Distance to settlements and multi-
use zones
Correct presentation of documen-
tation to the relevant administra-
tive or judicial authorities 
Clear legal framework
MPA distance to marine traffic Ratio of detected versus inter-
cepted violations
Correctly prepared reports
Availibility of information and 
intelligence
Planning systematic patrols
Number of days patrolling per 
month/year
Vessels used by violators
Indicators for Each Phase
Probability of detection Probability of arrest Probability of prosecution Probability of sanction
Table 1: Components of Law Enforcement
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Determination of Vessel Detection Probability in Maritime Areas
In this section we carry out an analysis of the available vessels, number of personnel required, and 
equipment, which affect the success of patrolling. Although there are several methods to deter-
mine detection capacity, we present a quantitative analysis of each MPA which takes into account 
the size and complexity of the marine area and the number of patrol vessels available, using the 
following definition (Naval Operations Analysis, Naval Institute Press 2nd Ed. Annapolis Maryland, 
USA, 1986).
The lower limit (conservative) of detection probability in a random search within  
an area A is given by:
Where:
P(det) = Detection Probability
  W     = Sweep Width  
                   (Max. effective detection distance, depends on sensor and contact type)
  L       = Distance covered on search track
  A       = Area being patrolled
We assume that the fraction of the area covered in each segment (WL/A) is suffiicently small.
The equation is applicable under the following assumptions:
The position of the contact has a uniform distribution within the area A (it may be found anywhere • 
in the area and there are no signs of the vessel).
The search is random.• 
From the formula presented above, we can state that the detection probability improves when:
The sweep width •	 (effective detection distance from boat) is greater, this means that we have a 
sensor able to detect over large distances or that the contact is large (detection might be visual, 
radar or infrared).
The distance covered is greater.•	  This is achieved by patrolling the area for a longer period of 
time, which makes autonomy (the period spent at the site) critical. Vessel speed is also critical 
(the greater the speed, the better – this is why airplanes are ideal for this work).
The area is small.•	  As area covered increases, and the search methods (eg. Binoculars) remain the 
same, the detection probability will decline.
Interception and Arrest
We examined the patrol vessels available versus those used by poachers to intercept “detected 
infractions,” or citings within the protected area. It is worth noting that a Park not only requires fast 
and readily available vessels, but also clear boarding protocols and evidence collection procedures 
for presentation in a court of law. Anecdotes abound where cases are thrown out of court because 
Park officials did not follow official procedures resulting in the poacher being set free without fine. 
Prosecution
In this section we analyzed the key processes to ensure effective prosecution in each country. Sanctions 
are usually not administered by National Parks, but by environmental authorities for administrative cases, 
and the judicial system for penal cases. It is common to encounter contradictory laws as well as 
regulations and economic interests which thwart the rule of law. We analyzed the regulatory framework 
and specific cases to evaluate the speed and effectiveness of sanction processes; the goal of which 
was to provide recommendations to change laws, highlight conflicts of interest that compromise the 
impartiality of the regulatory authority, and identify low cost alternatives to improve effectiveness. 
 P(det) = 1 – e – AW L
Sanctions
Finally, we analyzed the relation of cases initated versus those completed to measure the effectiveness 
of the system. Generally, the statsitics are poor in developing countries and reveal the need for advocacy 
campaigns to foster dialogue and develop political will for institutional reform. 
Results
This publication represents the work of a multi-national team. Research methods were developed and 
applied by a Principal Investigator based in Ecuador with the support of local researchers with expertise 
in each Seascape country. Although the availability of statistics and the degree of collaboration from 
authorities varied, we were able to compile sufficient information for analysis. It must be noted that most 
MPAs in the Seascape were established relatively recently, with the exception of Galapagos. In addition 
to the law enforcement chain, each country report includes an analysis of the institutional arrangement 
governing each MPA, existing legal framework and management procedures. We also analyzed the 
interests of all stakeholders and their relation to their respective MPA. Some MPAs boast innovative 
governance mechanisms, which affect enforcement and can serve as models for other MPAs. We also 
report socio-economic statistics regarding the fishing and tourism sectors in order to demonstrate the 
importance of protected areas for local and national economies. Finally, we identify critical points in the 
regulatory framework where conflicts of interest and serious weaknesses exist.
We hope this publication will serve as a useful planning tool for both MPA administrators and 
Ministries, which require a brief analysis, specific recommendations and cost estimations for 
recommended actions. In addition, the publication may serve as a useful resource for potential 
donors and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) when defining their investment strategies in 
cooperation with authorities. 
We envisage the impacts of this report to be the following:
Prioritization of actions to improve the capacity for arrest and interception.1. 
Identification of the main limitations in terms of equipment and personnel (availability, 2. 
qualifications, training, maintenance, etc.) and actions required to minimize or reverse 
current situation.
Identification of obstacles in prosecution and sentencing of violators, including strategies to 3. 
strengthen laws and legal processes.
Fostering of Improved collaboration between authorities within and between countries.4. 
Optimization of limited resources and equipment.5. 
Provision of a systematic plan to strengthen each link in the law enforcement chain for 6. 
each MPA.
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Description of the Island
Cocos Island is located 532 km to the southwest of Cabo Blanco, in the Pacific Ocean, halfway 
between the continent and the Galapagos Islands. Cocos Island is influenced by a complex system 
of marine currents: the North Equatorial Countercurrent, the Costa Rica Coastal Current, and the 
Costa Rican Thermal Convection Dome. The island covers an area of 24 km2, and is surrounded 
by 1,997 km2 of protected marine habitat for a total circumference of 22 km around the island. The 
Cocos Ridge emerges from the ocean only at this point, making it a site of great interest in the study 
of the seafloor and marine volcanic activity. 
There are no nearby fishing ports or coastal communities. The only people present on the island are 
personnel from the Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (MINAET), the National 
Coastguard Service (SNG) and MarViva, along with volunteers and occasional visiting tourists who 
come to dive. In order to control illegal fishing, the presence of fishing vessels is prohibited within the 
12-mile limit, but this regulation is not applied in cases of force majeure or accidental entry.
Socioeconomic Value 
Tourism: Cocos Island generates approximately US$6,309,490 for the private sector and 
between US$441,490 and US$451,290 for the Cocos National Park (PNC) in entry fees (maximum 
expected values).
Description of the Costa Rican Fishing Fleet 
The Costa Rican fishing fleet is a mixed fleet, which ranges from artisanal fiberglass boats to oceanic 
tuna vessels. These vessels are primarily semi-industrial or are industrial boats with sufficient 
autonomy and fishing gear to operate around the island. 
In Costa Rica, commercial fishing is classified under the following categories described in Article 27 
of the Law of Fishing and Agriculture (See Table 3). In this report, we will limit our description to the 
Pacific coast fleet.
Costa Rica does not possess its own tuna fleet, so it issues annual fishing permits to approximately 
24 tuna vessels, which fly flags from Mexico, USA, Panama, Vanuatu and Venezuela. All employ 
purse seines to capture tuna. The Eastern Tropical Pacific tuna fishery is managed in an integrated 
regional manner by the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC). 
Cocos Island 
Costa Rica
Dive Tour Companies at Cocos Island
Company No. Passengers Expeditions/Year Cost 2008 Gross Annual Income 
(US Dollar)
Income to PNC  
(US Dollar)
Undersea Hunter 14 25 $4.495 $1,250,000 $85,750
Sea Hunter 18 25 $4,496 $1,250,000 $110,250
Argos 14/18 10 $4,795 $750,000 $34,300 to $44,100
Okeanos 22 35 $3,735 $2,875,950 $188,650
Pacific Explorer 92 1 $1,995 $183,540 $22,540
TOTAL Gross annual income (approximate) $6,309,490 $441,490 - $451,290
Table 2: PNC Income 
Note: Entry to the PNC includes anchor rights ($25 to $150 depending on the size of the vessel) and the right of admission per passenger ($25) 
It is also necessary to consider the influence of the foreign longline fleet, which consists of vessels 
operating outside the exclusive economic zone (EEZ), but which land their catches at private 
national docks. These vessels not only operate outside the EEZ, but also enter within its limits, as 
they know that the coastal nations lack the capacity to control their marine borders. From 2004 to 
2008, an average of between 3,000 and 6,000 tonnes of fishery products were landed annually, 
corresponding to an average of 90 to 140 foreign vessels.
According to estimates by the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), in 2002, 
fishing provided direct employment to 8,567 people and indirect employment to a further 16,500 
(Source: 2002 Census Information, National Institute of Statistics and Censuses). Excluding the 
sports fishing sector, in 2002, fishing generated US$38.9 million; more recent data is not available. 
In recent years, Costa Rica has also become an important tourist destination for sports fishers. In 
2002, this activity generated US$32 million (FAO, 2002). Neither the Costa Rica Institute of Fisheries 
and Aquaculture (INCOPESCA) nor MINAET record statistics for this activity, as it is mostly carried 
out as catch-and-release. Important target species include sea bass, wahoo, dolphinfish, snapper, 
barracuda and tuna.
Analysis of Context/ Governance:
In Costa Rica there is an abundance of environmental legislation dispersed between laws, regulations 
and decrees. Despite its fragmentation and lack of cohesion, this legislation does contain a series of 
rules, which cover a wide range of environmental aspects. However, they pose serious complications 
in terms of responsibilities, timely execution, decentralization for administrative cases, and lack of 
impartiality in regulatory entities. This report focuses on the legislation pertaining to the protection of 
the marine resources of the Cocos National Park MPA.
Landings By Fishing Fleet 
Costa Rica: 2005, Pacific Fishing Fleet
ARTISANAL (small and medium scale) 11,225,737
SEMI-INDUSTRIAL 3,886,261
FOREIGN TUNA 22,000,000
FOREIGN LONGLINE 5,337,186
TOTAL 42,449,184
Source: Dept. Fishery Statistics – INCOPESCA; Unit: Kilogram 
Table 4: Fishery landings in Costa Rica
Criteria Small Scale Medium Scale Advanced Scale Semi-Industrial Industrial
No. of vessels 2,588 809 205 40 24
Distance from coast 
of fishing operations 
3 Nautical Miles 40 Nautical Miles 40 Nautical Miles No limits No limits
Target species Grouper, sea bass, 
bullshark, billfish, ham-
merheads, tiger sharks
Tuna, dolphinfish, big-
eye, sailfish and marlin
Tuna, swordfish and 
shark as bycatch
Shrimp, sardine and 
tuna
Tuna
Fishing gear Hand lines or bottom 
set lines with J8 hooks, 
fine mesh nets and 
trammel nets
Longline Mechanical gear and 
longlines
Trawl and purse seine Purse seine
Tabe 3: Description of the Costa Rican fishing fleet
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Dissemination of Regulations
Flyers and booklets explaining the fishing regulations have been published and distributed among 
fishers during workshops and meetings organized by NGOs and authorities. In addition, between 
2002 and 2006, members of the Department of Outreach and Training from INCOPESCA carried out 
27 workshops in coastal communities to train fishers (men and women) on:
The new law of Fishing and Aquaculture. • 
Basic principles of the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing.• 
Professional formation of the artisanal fishers.• 
The commercialization of fish.• 
MarViva also carries out annual trainings for attorneys, lawyers and civil servants of the Judicial 
Investigation Organism (OIJ) and members of SNG and MINAET, except in 2006.
Stakeholders
Public Sector Stakeholders
Private Stakeholders
Name of Institution  
(Public Entity)
Role in MPA Role of Civil Servant
Cocos Island Marine Conservation 
Area
Direct administration Director 
Administrator of the National Park
INCOPESCA Fisheries control Director of the Judicial Procedures Organ  
Department of Environmental Control
National Coastguard Service Fisheries control Environmental Officer
District Attorney, Punta Arenas Sentencing of offenders Attorney
Table 5: Public Sector Actors
Table 6: Private Sector Stakeholders
Stakeholder Type of Stakeholder:  
Public, Private,  
Community, NGO, other
Type of Attitude or Commitment to 
the Management of the MPA
MarViva NGO Patrol support/ environmental education
Imaging Foundation NGO Supporting. Environmental education
FAICO NGO Patrol support / environmental education
Pretoma NGO Supporting. Research/environmental education
CIMAR University Research
UNA University Research
Undersea Hunter Private Logistics and Patrol support, diving
Okeanos Private Logistics and Patrol support, diving
Tuna Fishers Private Opposing, Industrial tuna fishing
Longliners Private Opposing. Fishery for shark, dolphinfish, 
tuna, billfish
Sport fishers Private Billfish, tuna
OET Private Tourism
Surveillance and Detection
Ministry of Environment, Energy and Telecommunications (MINAET)
Personnel: 22 employees, 15 of whom work in enforcement. 
Average salary: $850 per month/ Administrator: $1,200.
Training: Personnel receive training once a year on average, and recently received training with 
the Incident Command System. Outstanding personnel have also received training at the National 
Learning Institute (INA) on marine and nautical issues. Along with the SNG, they have received 
training on boarding and seizure protocols and procedures. Among the personnel with respon-
sibilities in control and patrolling, biologists and technicians specialized in vessel operation and 
mechanical maintenance have been hired.
National Coastguard Service (SNG)
Personnel: Five employees are permanently based on Cocos Island, who crew the vessel 
Capitán Araya. The island is visited once a month by 10 more members when they carry out 
patrolling activities on the vessels Santa María, Pancha Carrasco and Juan Mora Fernández. 
Each expedition on each of these boats lasts ten days. However, the itinerary is rarely followed 
and in most years, only about eight trips are undertaken.
Training: Each SNG employee has received an initial five-month training course on the use of 
firearms, self-defense, survival skills and marine skills. Each year, more specialized training is given 
to assist in executive promotion, such as navigation, marine legislation, call to action (exercises to 
practice emergency skills), and drug smuggling detention, which is becoming more and more 
difficult each year. 
MarViva
Personnel: Two staff members are based permanently on Cocos Island who operate the vessel 
MarViva I. Another eight members sporadically visit the island with the patrol vessel Phoenix.
Contributions to the Management of the Marine Reserve
Institution Amount USD $
National Coastguard Service $107,000
Cocos Island Marine Conservation Area $278,737
MarViva $329,589
TOTAL $715,326
Source: Appraisal of the environmental damage caused by Ariel Bustamante according to case  
08-200413-431-PE at the Punta Arenas District Attorney. 
Table 7: Contributions to the management of PNC
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Detection Probability
The Cocos Island MPA is demarcated by a circumference of 12 nautical miles measured from the 
center of the island. The area of ocean within this circumference is 603.97 square nautical miles 
(603.97 Nm2).
According to the equation defined at the beginning of this publication, detection probability should 
be estimated with the following site conditions and patrol strategy:
Sweep width: Effective detection distance between 8 and 16 nautical miles (navigation radar X-
Band, considering that small or wooden hull vessels must be found) installed on oceanic vessels. 
Distance covered: Variable between 120 and 450 nautical miles (under current autonomy, this is 
equivalent to approximately 12 to 45 hours of navigation)
Area to explore: 603.97 nm2.
With these parameters, the detection probability is:
Due to the small area in question, the probability of successful patrolling is very high (we have 
highlighted all those combinations resulting in a probability greater than 75%). However, patrol 
vessels require refueling causing them to abandon their station. As we have mentioned earlier, they 
often have maintenance problems, which prevents their presence on site as well. A well-maintained 
vessel will normally be available 75 - 80% of the year, so it is necessary to have at least two vessels 
operating permanently in order to have a permanent patrolling program. It is clear that the Cocos 
Island MPA has serious maintenance issues, and this represents the main obstacle at present.
Due to the remoteness of the area, the vessels must be oceanic. It would be advisable to have at 
least one small rapid vessel for emergency situations. The crew for each oceanic vessel should 
consist of six or seven park wardens, whereas the crew of smaller vessels should have three to 
four park wardens. This implies a total crew of 15-18 park wardens for the entire fleet (allowing for 
rotational shifts), plus administrative and ground support personnel. Patrolling is not complicated 
in theory, but due to the logistical and technical factors mentioned above, the current operation is 
not effective.
Table 8: Detection Probability within the Marine Protected Area at Cocos Island
Cocos Island MPA
           Maximum Effective Detection Distance (Nm)
62.97%  6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
120 69.64% 79.60% 86.29% 90.78% 93.81% 95.84% 97.20% 98.12%
150 77.4 7% 86.29% 91.66% 94.92% 96.91% 98.12% 98.86% 99.30%
180 83.27% 90.78% 94.92% 97.20% 98.46% 99.15% 99.53% 99.74%
210 87.58% 93.81% 96.91% 98.46% 99.23% 99.62% 99.81% 99.90%
240 90.78% 95.84% 98.12% 99.15% 99.62% 99.83% 99.92% 99.96%
270 93.16% 97.20% 98.86% 99.53% 99.81% 99.92% 99.97% 99.99%
300 94.92% 98.12% 99.30% 99.74% 99.90% 99.96% 99.99% 100.00%
330 96.23% 98.74% 99.58% 99.86% 99.95% 99.98% 99.99% 100.00%
360 97.20% 99.15% 99.74% 99.92% 99.98% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00%
390 97.92% 99.43% 99.84% 99.96% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
420 98.46% 99.62% 99.90% 99.98% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
450 98.86% 99.74% 99.94% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%D
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As the Cocos Island MPA is relatively small, we recommend the installation of a land-based radar and 
the use of vessels primarily for interception. This would reduce the recurring costs for fuel and the need 
for backup crew. As the problem of marine control must necessarily observe the waters surrounding 
the MPA, this action requires a complementary exercise in sovereignty in the surrounding EEZ, and this 
does not occur in the case of Costa Rica.
Patrol Vessels and Applied Technology 
At present there are four vessels for permanent patrols at Cocos Island, none of which are available 
100% of the time. The patrol boat Cocos Patrol has continuous mechanical problems, and is operational 
approximately 50% of the time. MarViva I has been in service since 2003 and still functions well. Capitán 
Araya is a new vessel, which arrived in March 2009. However, it had to return to the continent and its 
service record is intermittent. FAICO II arrived to Cocos in March 2009 and to date operates efficiently. 
MarViva also patrols occasionally on the vessel Phoenix, when required to do so by MINAET or SNG.
The onboard equipment is optimal and we suggest the addition of night vision equipment. 
Communication between the Cocos Island administration, the San Jose office, and patrol vessels 
is limited. For seven months in 2009 not only did the telephone malfunction, but the cellular phone 
antennas were also damaged. There is Internet service, but only at 128 kbps bandwidth. The HF 
radio was also broken. There is a single side band radio and marine VHF. In summary, there is 
internal communication between Wafer Bay and Chatam Bay, but there is no way of communicating 
with people on the continent. When urgent communication is required, they request support from the 
Undersea Hunter or MarViva.
Organization and Planning for Patrols 
There is a Memorandum of Understanding between MINAET, SNG and MarViva to improve patrolling 
at Cocos Island through the contribution of personnel and equipment from each organization. The 
Executive Committee, conformed by Commander Carmen Castro Morales (SNG), Walter Gonzalez 
(MINAET, Cocos Island Conservation Area) and Francisco Estrada (MarViva), meets once a month 
to coordinate joint operations. In general, patrols are carried out randomly at night or early morning, 
when fishers are most likely to enter the reserve.
Table 9: Patrol vessels at Cocos Island.
Vessels for Patrolling and Applied Technology
Characteristics 
Vessel Autonomy Equipment Motor Size Speed
Cocos Patrol 350 MN SSB Radio, marine band, 2 GPS, 1 12-mile radar, auxiliary motor 36 HP, 1 life raft 
for 5 p., 1 VMS beacon, 1 EPIRB, video cameras and others.
500 HP 9 Kts
Marviva I 900 MN Radar FURUNO, incorporated GPS,satellite telephone, SSB radio FURUNO, Radio 
UHF, video camaras
-.- 8 Kts
FAICO II 180 MN Radar 12 miles, Radar 32 miles, GPS, SSB radio and marine bandwidth 250 HP 45 Kts
Capitán Araya n.d. Radar 12 miles Raytheon, fixed GPS, UHF Radio -.- 45 Kts
Santa María 1,000 MN Radar 24 miles, fixed GPS, SSB Radio SSB and marine bandwidth -.- 14 Kts
Pancha Carrasco 1,000 MN Radar 24 miles, fixed GPS, SSB Radio and marine bandwidth -.- 14 Kts
Juan Mora  
Fernández
1,000 MN Radar 24 miles, fixed GPS, SSB Radio and marine bandwidth -.- 14 Kts
Phoenix 1,500 MN Cellular phone, Radio SSB, marine VHF radio normal and private frequency. 450 HP -.-
10
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Interception and Arrest
The main results obtained from these joint operations in 2008 (Castro et al., 2008) include:
196 patrols were carried out, covering an area of 8,618.2 nautical miles over 1,503 hours. • 
MINAET provided the greatest manpower with 3,810 man-hours, followed by MarViva with 
3,680 and finally SNG with 719.
The greatest abundance of longline vessels, an average of 75.4 per month, was observed • 
between May and November 2008 (an “observation” refers to vessels which were seen either 
in the protected waters but escaped before being intercepted, or were found at the borders of 
the MPA). 37 findings were made, resulting in 104.5 miles of longline (“finding” refers to fishing 
gear found within the MPA limits without an apparent perpetrator). The greatest number of 
lines was found between March and September. 
The most abundant species found on the longlines were yellowfin tuna (124 individuals) and • 
sharks (81 individuals).
Between 2005 and 2007, approximately 300 joint patrols were carried out per year. In 2008 there were 
only 196 patrols, a reduction of 30%. 
The number of vessels sighted per year has also declined (Figure 2). The greatest number of 
sightings corresponds to 2005, the year that the Fishing Law was passed. The lowest number of 
sightings occurred in 2008, although this does not indicate a reduction in the number of vessels 
operating illegally in the area, but rather a reduction in the number of patrols.
The number of seizures, defined as the act when the State takes possession of fishing gear used 
illegally in the MPA in the presence of those responsible for that gear, has also reduced significantly, 
from 18 in 2005 to only one in 2008 and none at all in 2007 (Figure 3). 
This analysis shows that illegal fishing pressure around Cocos Island is constant and has not been 
dissuaded by the joint operations. This is clear from the number of vessels sighted and the gear 
findings, which have both remained constant over time. The significant reduction in cases where 
gear has been seized – almost zero in the last two years, is a simple reflection of the fact that violators 
are able to escape.
Figure 1: Number of patrols per year, Cocos Island, 
2008 (Castro et al, 2008).
Figure 2: Number of vessels observed per year, 
Cocos Island, 2008 (Castro et al, 2008).
Figure 3: Annual seizures of fishing gear and vessels,  
Cocos Island, (Castro et al, 2008).
According to interviews with SNG and MINAET officials, this situation occurs because illegal 
fishers enter the MPA and set short lines of less than 100 hooks. When a patrol boat approaches 
they have time to escape, because the patrol boats working around the island in 2008 were slow 
in comparison (MarViva I and Cocos Patrol). Fishers are willing to run the risk of capture and even 
the loss of fishing gear, so much so, that when they enter the MPA they use plastic bottles and 
other low value items as buoys, which they paint blue to camouflage them. At present, there 
are two rapid patrol vessels at the island, which have the capacity of intercepting illegal fishers 
(Capitan Araya and FAICO II). It is hoped that in the near future, as these vessels are used more, 
a larger number of vessels operating illegally in the MPA will be caught red-handed. Despite this 
game of cat and mouse, national fishers do tend to collaborate and inform the island authorities 
when purse seine tuna vessels are present around the island.
Use of Remote Monitoring Systems for Vessels
In Costa Rica there is still no legislation enforcing the use of remote control devices on national 
and foreign vessels. This would be an excellent tool for monitoring the activities of these boats, 
not only for issues relating to fishing, but also for reasons of national security. On January 7, 2009, 
INCOPESCA announced that the national fleet would be subjected to this type of control, which 
would be implemented and in force as soon as the INCOPESCA executive board emits an official 
decree. There is still no agreement, and in any case the official announcement did not include 
monitoring the foreign fleet, which is a major weakness.
Prosecutions, Sanctions, and Sentencing
There is a “Protocol of Actions to take in the Case of Illegal Harvesting of Marine and Coastal 
Resources (inside and outside of MPAs)” which is, for the most part, respected. This protocol lays 
out the responsibilities of each institution (MINAET, INCOPESCA, SNG) in the case of an illegal 
fishing operation. There is also an annually reviewed Memorandum between the Coastguard, 
MINAET, and MarViva regarding the operations at Cocos Island. However, it is important 
to mention that INCOPESCA is an autonomous agency. Created in 1995, under Executive 
Board Law No. 7384, INCOPESCA is an autonomous agency with its own legal status and 
assets. INCOPESCA is presided over by an Executive President who is designated directly 
by the President of the Republic. The maximum authority of the institution is the Board of Directors, 
which is presided over by the Executive President. The Board of Directors is made up of nine mem-
bers, three of whom are members of government and six of whom belong to the national fishing 
sector, and include representatives of the tuna cannery, longline fishery, and shrimp trawlers.
According to the Comptroller of the Republic, Lcda. Rocía Aguilar Montoya, in declarations to the 
Special Permanent Commission for the Environment of the Legislative Assembly on February, 28 
2008, in reference to the Comptroller’s Report of February, 28 2008 titled: Report on the Evaluation 
of the Management of the Costa Rican Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture in Relation to Patrolling 
and Control of Shark Fishing (DFOE-PGA-86/2006):
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Our report does not really address the issue of executive boards, rather I did perhaps question 
whether it was appropriate that the Board Members authorize/define the tariffs for their own 
industry. I think it is more a matter of prevention of conflict of interest, and if at any point a 
reform is proposed it would be worth at least discussing this issue. Based on this history and 
what we have seen, at the end of the day what we have is an entity that is exercising power, or 
guardianship over its own sector, which if allowed to self-regulate itself, will face difficulties in 
reaching the best situation. 
It is precisely this conflict of interest that the Comptroller states is causing the lack of political will 
for the application of INCOPESCA sanctions -- even when violators are caught by the MINAET and 
SNG authorities. According to the Fisheries Law, it is INCOPESCA that must establish administrative 
sanctions. Now, MINAET and SNG go directly to the Office of the Attorney when the Fisheries Law 
is violated. These penal processes take much longer than an administrative process. Regardless, the 
INCOPESCA sanctions never materialize given their conflict of interest. Compounding this issue further is 
the lack of a legal framework which punishes violators severely enough to serve as a deterrent.
 In 1996, the articles that laid out the sanctions in the Fisheries Law of 1948 were declared uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court. The Court also clarified that as INCOPESCA is an autonomous 
agency that does not strictly belong to the Government, their inspectors and personnel do not have 
the same authority as the police (whereas coastguards and MINAET workers do have the same 
authority as the police). Due to this situation, there was no way to penalize illegal fishing in Costa Rica 
other than through the Penal Code, which establishes prison sentences of 3 to 15 years for piracy.
Between 2000 and 2005, 60 to 70 cases of piracy were brought to the Puntarenas courts (there is 
no database with exact numbers, but this is an estimate from the MarViva Association). The Fisheries 
Law was passed in March 2005. Article 9 expressly forbids commercial and sports fishing activities 
in national parks, natural monuments and biological reserves. It does, however, permit the accidental 
presence or entry due to force majeure of vessels in MPAs. Article 153 places a fine of twenty to sixty 
minimum wages (14,000,000.00 Colones = US$22,000.00) and the suspension of the license in 
question, for anyone who authorizes or exercises commercial or sports fishing. The passing of the 
Fisheries Law created confusion among the authorities because no one was sure which law to 
apply in the case of illegal fishing within the Cocos Island MPA. Should it be charged as piracy via 
the Penal Code, which implied a prison sentence, or as illegal fishing via the Fisheries Law, which 
implied administrative sanctions? 
According to the Court III of the Supreme Court of Justice (SCJ) (Sentence N°: 379-2008), the Penal 
Code is only applied for unauthorized exploitation of fisheries resources without a fishing license. If the 
violator has a license, then the Fisheries Law must be applied, according to Sentence N°: 379-2008 
from Court III of the SCJ (and therefore, only administrative sanctions may be applied). At the same time, 
the Court of Criminal Appeals of San Ramon (Sentence N° 662-2007) states that the Penal Code only 
applies to fish resources, whereas the Fisheries Law is broader and applies to commercial fishing. The 
Court of Criminal Appeals further ordered that all open cases of piracy that had not advanced in one year 
be dismissed due to the statute of limitations. This caused most of the piracy cases, some 50 to 70, to 
be dropped. Some cases were also dropped because the violators were caught with lobsters, and the 
Penal Code only applies to “fish” resources. 
In conclusion, only seven cases of piracy remained, three of which have concluded, and four of 
which are still pending. All three of the former cases resulted in prison sentences of three years, 
one of which was suspended with a fine. The four ongoing cases began in 2001 and 2002. After 
the passing of the Fisheries Law, five more illegal fishing and three shark finning cases have been 
opened. Of the former, only one has gone to court, three are with the District Attorney and the status 
of the remaining case is unknown. None of the shark finning cases have advanced even as far as 
the District Attorney.
Case Studies of Piracy (Penal Code) 
The vessel • Rita Victoria was captured on June 25th, 2005 for piracy, and on March 10th 
2007, the Criminal Court of Puntarenas passed a guilty verdict on the Captain, sentencing 
him to a suspended sentence which included a fine of 1,000,0000 colones (US$2,000) over 
a two year period. The deadline expired on October 3rd, 2009. The process took two years 
and four months.
Oscar Serrano Barrio, Captain of the vessel • Capitán Julián, was found guilty of piracy on 
February 12th, 2004, and sentenced to three years in prison, which was suspended and 
reduced to three years probation. The defense appealed, but lost the appeal on September 
20th, 2004.
The vessel • Miss Stacy was captured while engaging in illegal activities on May 29th, 2002. 
On May 10th, 2007, the Criminal Court at Puntarenas ruled in favor of the defendant, 
Captain Leyvin González Fernández, as the crime was redefined as a violation under the 
new Fisheries Law. The Ministry of Public Affairs appealed, arguing that when the crime was 
committed, only the Penal Code existed, and therefore it should be judged as such. The 
appeal was accepted on December 5th, 2007 and the accused was charged with piracy. 
This case is still pending after five years and two months.
Case Studies for Illegal Fishing and Shark Finning (Fisheries Law) 
The Panama vessel • Tiuna was caught while illegally fishing with seven tonnes of yellowfin tuna 
in its nets on January 29th, 2008. Two charges were made: one with the Environmental Admin-
istrative Tribunal (TAA) and another with the Ministry of Public Affairs (Puntarenas Courts). On 
September 22nd, 2009, the TAA (Resolution 843-08-TAA) imposed a fine of US$668,427.81 
for environmental damages, and ordered the Executive President of INCOPESCA to revoke 
its fishing license. On January 31st, 2008, Ariel Bustamante (Captain of the vessel) was tried 
for criminal offences at the Criminal Court of Puntarenas. On December 17th, 2008, he went 
to trial at Puntarenas, accused of violating article 153 of the Fisheries Law, which implies 
a sanction of 20 to 60 minimum wages and the cancellation of the license. The trial is ongoing.
Between 2008 and 2009, three vessels (• Kendy, Rey de Reyes, Franju III) were caught in 
the Cocos Island MPA with shark fins minus their respective carcasses. The violators were 
absolved in all three cases because Articles 40 and 139 of the Fisheries Law references 
only the landing of shark fins without their respective bodies, but makes no reference to the 
transport of removed fins.
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Recommendations 
Cocos Island, Costa Rica
Surveillance and Detection
Critical Aspect Severely restricted budget.
Recommendation Change the Law of National Parks and allow greater 
decentralization, subcontracting, self management or 
privatization of services in National Parks.
Feasibility No political will. The proposal has been presented before, 
but has not received public support. New options need to 
be considered.
Estimated Cost US$40,000 for lobbying and technical and legal 
research of a possible solution.
Critical Aspect Lack of personnel.
Recommendation Between 5 and 7 more Park Wardens are required to 
cover crew, minor maintenance, and land based opera-
tions control.
Feasibility 1) Not feasible unless the distribution of income to the 
PNC is reformed as all funds currently go to a centralized 
state account. 
2) Medium feasibility if external funding from a donor or 
NGO is obtained.
Estimated Cost US$48,000 – US$67,000 per year.
Critical Aspect Park Warden salaries are not competitive.
Recommendation 1) Increase budget for Park Wardens, or; 
2) Charge extra fees for tourism and use these funds 
for salaries. 
Feasibility 1) No political will and no funds.
2) The MPA should be allocated part of the funds it 
generates in order to create an additional per diem 
payment for field operations. 
Estimated Cost US$25,000 for lobbying costs.
Critical Aspect Lack of support from national fishing sector. Clear inten-
tion to evade patrols.
Recommendation 1) Extend the MPA area to 20 miles.
2) Minimize by-catch by regulating fishing gear. 
Feasibility Medium. MINAET is currently organizing a workshop to 
consult different sectors on the creation of a new MPA 
in the area related to the Cocos Island National Park.
Estimated Cost 1) US$50,000 to extend the MPA.
2) US$150,000 to make changes to fishing gear.
Surveillance and Detection
Critical Aspect Limited electronic detection, monitoring and patrol 
equipment.
Recommendation 1) A radar should be installed on the island so 
that illegal vessels can be detected and patrolling 
frequency reduced.
2) A national law that obliges vessels to use onboard 
tracking devices should be promoted, both for Costa 
Rican vessels and foreign vessels which exploit the EEZ.
3) Add more detection equipment such as night vision, 
digital cartography, AIS receivers, etc.
Feasibility 1) High. There is interest.
2) Medium. The Maritime Authority should be promoting 
the regulations based on the IMO recommendations.
3) High. 
Estimated Cost 1) US$75,000 including installation and compatible 
power supply.
2) US$50,000 technical and legal assistance.
3) US$40,000.
Critical Aspect Poor communication between the installations on 
Cocos Island and the continent.
Recommendation Provide communications equipment (radio, broadband 
internet) and repair existing equipment.
Feasibility There is interest and willpower.
Estimated Cost US$50,000.
Critical Aspect Lack of boat maintenance.
Recommendation Subcontract or find external technical assistance for 
boat maintenance via a fund that would cover costs for 
mechanics, tools and critical spare parts.
Feasibility High. The MINAET-SNG-MarViva Commission acknowl-
edges the maintenance problem. 
Estimated Cost US $50,000 - $60,000 per year.
Critical Aspect Tuna vessels flying international flags and national boats 
constantly enter the MPA (and the Costa Rican EEZ 
without control or authorization).
Recommendation Implement obligatory monitoring via AIS satellite control 
to improve control over the entire EEZ and Cocos Island 
MPA, and declare the Cocos MPA an IMO Particu-
larly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA), which would provide 
MINAET and SNG with a broader scope of action.
Feasibility Medium. There has already been a pronouncement by 
INCOPESCA that this system will be implemented for 
national vessels, but the foreign fleet should also be 
included.
Estimated Cost VMS system: $300,000. Includes costs of equipment 
and technical-legal assistance.
Prosecution (cont.)
Critical Aspect Shark finning control only states that sharks must be 
landed with the fins attached, but does not mention 
transport of fins; neither does it specifically prohibit 
finning.
Recommendation 1) Include the prohibition of transport of shark fins in 
the Fisheries Law regulations. 
2) Use universities to establish a control and monitoring 
mechanism at landing sites.
Feasibility 1) Low. More interested parties need to be grouped 
together for a bigger political clout. 
2) Low.
Estimated Cost 1) US$20,000 for an NGO to lobby.
2) US$30,000.
Critical Aspect Impunity: slow processes and loss of cases.
Recommendation Provide a lawyer for PNC to work on cases of infringe-
ments and violations.
Feasibility High. Interest exists.
Estimated Cost US$70,000 for two years.
Critical Aspect MINAET not authorised to sanction.
Recommendation We recommend that SNG be empowered to give 
administrative fines and/or vessel retention for up to 
30 days (act as an examining magistrate).
Feasibility Low.
Estimated Cost US$85,000 for legal analysis and lobbying.
Interception and Arrest
Critical Aspect Lack of available speed boats that can intercept violators.
Recommendation Implement a system of maintenance and spare parts 
logistics.
Feasibility Medium. 
Estimated Cost US $50,000 - $60,000 per year.
Critical Aspect Poor inspection upon boarding.
Recommendation Training in onboard procedures and crime scene 
investigation, as well as incident report preparation.
Feasibility High.
Estimated Cost US$20,000.
Critical Aspect Obvious conflict of interest in the INCOPESCA Board of 
Directors.
Recommendation 1) Move INCOPESCA to the Ministry of Agriculture or 
elevate it to ministerial status. It must respond to the 
President of the Republic and must lose its autonomy 
and the authority of the Board of Directors. 
2) Media campaign and legal action in high profile 
cases.
Feasibility Low. Not politically viable. Although the problem is 
acknowledged by several sectors, there is no political will 
to change the situation.
Estimated Cost US$100,000. This should be done by an NGO, which 
would look for support from government agencies 
(MINAET, SNG) and other state authorities (Parliament).
Critical Aspect Lack of training for attorneys, Attorneys change 
constantly.
Recommendation Permanent training of Puntarenas attorneys at least 
once a year.
Feasibility Politically viable. MINAET, SNG and MARVIVA are already 
working on this.
Estimated Cost US $30,000 per year.
Critical Aspect No sanctions for vessels which arrive at the island even 
though their permits do not allow them to go further than 
40 miles from the continent.
Recommendation 1) Include sanctions for violations of permitted 
vessel autonomy in the new Maritime Navigation 
and Safety Law. 
2) Lobby for the MPA to be declared an IMO Particularly 
Sensitive Sea Area. 
3) Provide the MPA Administration with the power to 
initiate legal proceedings ex-officio.
Feasibility 1) A Navigation Law is currently being drafted. According 
to Carmen Castro (SNG), sanctions for violations are 
being included. 
2) SNG and MINAET can present a request to the IMO. 
3) Low.
Estimated Cost 1) Political will is required, no economic cost. SNG, 
MINAET, MarViva are actively working on this. 
2) No cost.  
3) US$10,000 for legal advice. 
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Description of the Island
Lying in the Gulf of Chiriquí, Coiba National Park (PNC) is made up of Coiba – the largest island in 
the Central-American Pacific with a surface area of 503.14 km2, and 38 smaller islands, islets and 
exposed rocks, which collectively cover a total area of 537.32 km2. The MPA covers 2,024.63 km2 
and includes one of the most extensive coral reef systems in the Eastern Pacific (17 km2). Studies 
have found a total of 800 species grouped in 123 families. The proximity of mangroves and reefs in 
certain areas creates conditions for the movement of marine species between these habitats – of 
117 species identified on the reefs, 45 are common to mangrove areas as well (Maté et al, 2007). 
The main current affecting PNC and its area of influence is the North-equatorial Countercurrent, 
which is at its strongest between May and December, when the Intertropical Convergence Zone is 
at its northernmost position (10-20°N), and is weaker from February to April, when the convergence 
zone is further to the south. 
The “marine reserve zone” is the area of the park where all extraction of natural or historical-
cultural resources is prohibited; and where only controlled human presence is permitted for 
activities such as patrolling, research, ecotourism and environmental education. This zone 
extends from the coastal fringe around the islands, islets and rocks within PNC outwards to 
sea for 1.8 km (one nautical mile), and encompasses an area of 476.52 km2. The “resource 
management zone” corresponds to the area which contains fisheries resources that may be 
sustainably harvested by artisanal or sports fishers. This includes activities such as sports 
diving, marine mammal watching, and research. These are permitted so long as they follow 
the management objectives of the protected area and are geared towards improving the 
quality of life of the inhabitants in the area of influence of the park.
Although there are 44 fishing communities in the PNC buffer zone, only six have been identified 
as main users. Operationally, the National Environment Authority (ANAM) manages the PNC in 
accordance with Law N° 44, 2004. It is therefore its responsibility to control and patrol the 537 
km2 of land area and 2,024 km2 of ocean. There is an area of 1,600 km2 to the west, adjacent 
to the PNC, which has been classified as a Special Marine Protected Zone (ZEPM). Both sites 
were declared World Natural Heritage Sites by UNESCO in 2005. 
Coiba National Park
Panama
Zone Area (km2) Percentage (%)
Marine Reserve Zone 476.52 23.54 
Resource Management Zone 1,428.01 70.53
Fishing Sub-zone 108.28 5.35
Transit Area 11.82 0.58
TOTAL 2,024.63 100
Table 10: Zoning of PNC Marine Area
Socioeconomic Value 
Tourism: Tourism activities are classified in three main categories: nature tourism, sports fishing 
and cruise tourism. As a result, tourism management by the Park administration should also be 
specialized for each category in order to satisfy their respective needs. Tourists are currently only 
classified by nationality (foreign or national) and age (adult, student, or pensioner).
Sports Fishing: This is one of the recreational activities that generates the most number of visits 
to the PNC, but functions exclusively in the surrounding oceanic waters and within the ZEPM at 
Montuosa Island and Hannibal Banks, where large numbers of record-breaking billfish have been 
caught. However, it is worth mentioning that it was not possible to find a single record of sports  
fishing landings, so the impact of this activity on the marine environment cannot be determined.  
The main sports fishing operators in the Gulf of Chiriquí are Pesca Panama and Coral Star.
Diving: There are nine land-based sports diving operators that visit the PNC. Six are based in 
Panama City, one in David (Chiriquí), another in Santa Catalina (Veraguas) and the last operator is a 
dive boat. On average, the trip expenditure for tour operators is US$661.00, which includes the pay 
for the captain, crew, fuel, ice, food, drinks and launch permit. 
Description of the Panama Fishing Fleet
There is a commercial fishery operating in the PNC that targets mainly groupers, snappers and 
dolphinfish. There is also a sports fishery for both benthic and pelagic species. Artisanal fishing 
has been highlighted as an important source of income for several communities, with up to 
30% of their inhabitants depending directly on the coastal-marine resources as their primary 
source of income. In reality, as the resident populations in the area lack permanent employment 
options that can absorb unemployed labor, this encourages overexploitation of the resources in 
the area (ACD, 2007).
Year Visitor Type 
National                   Foreign
TOTAL
2003 503 2,372 2,875
2004 1106 4,635 5,741
2005 706 5,936 6,642
2006 829 5,008 5,837
2007 1,484 4,582 6,066
2008 1,687 2,253 8,827
2009  
(hasta agosto)
797 2,904 3,701
Table 11: Visitors to PNC 
Source: ANAM 
Interesting facts about tourism in PNC
Provides direct employment to 50 people •	
(tour operators).
Accomodation prices are currently US$ •	
15 below the willingness to pay for 
nature tourists and sports fishers. In 
2007, income for this was US$29,957.
PNC entry fees are US$9 below willingness •	
to pay values for nature tourists; US$12 
below willingness to pay values for cruise 
tourists and US$15 below willingness to 
pay values for sports fishers.
Source: Montenegro, 2007.
Interesting facts about fisheries 
in Coiba
Directly employs 275 people.•	
Average monthly income is US$266 •	
per person.
Gross income in 2007 for the activity was •	
US$ 7.4 million.
Monthly income for fishing families in the •	
area is US$331, whereas the average family 
income for the study area was US$149
Source: Montenegro, 2007.
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and scientific vessels that enter the PNC must have a license provided by ANAM. This license 
is non-transferable, non-divisible and individual, and must be requested from the Headquarters of 
ANAM in Punta Gambote, Coiba Island. Park Authorities (wardens) with the appropriate identification 
may make detailed inspections of vessels while these are within the limits of the protected area.
The number of artisanal fishing licenses in the PNC is limited to 47 vessels. Currently, there are 41 
licensed artisanal fishing vessels in the Park. However, the Executive Committee will determine the 
requirements for the remaining six vessels to obtain their permits to operate within the Park. According 
to the current regulations, these permits allow the exploitation of a maximum of two fishery resources, 
which cannot be changed during the year: snapper, grouper and dolphinfish. 
Permits issued by ANAM are valid for eight days (artisanal and sports fishing permits) or one year 
(subsistence fishing permit) but have the following restrictions:
There is a maximum of two permits per month per vessel.1. 
The artisanal fishing vessel must have been on the Artisanal Fishing Register at 2. 
the moment Law N°44 of 2004 was passed. 
In accordance with current legislation, the permitted types of fishing gear are handlines, trolling lines, 
artisanal rod and vertical drift line, and subsistence (only cord is permitted). Sports fishing permitted 
techniques include catch and release with the use of circular hooks, and regulations on lines, reels, 
wire and hooks. Fishing with explosives or chemicals, by free diving or SCUBA are all prohibited, as 
are harpoons, dredges, beach seines, trawl nets, longlines, Hawaiian slings, and any type of leader 
lines connecting hooks to a motherline. Those vessels authorized to fish within the PNC are 
forbidden to carry unauthorized fishing gear or protected species while they remain in, or pass 
through, the protected area.
Vessel Size Tariff Capacity
Artisanal fishing Up to 35 feet $10.00 annually. To be reviewed 
from January 2010
Up to 5 fishers
Commercial Sports Fishing Vessels
Yachts Any size $10.00 monthly per foot boat 
length
Up to 4 fishers plus the captain
Boat/Panga Up to 27 feet $2.50 monthly per foot boat length Up to 4 fishers plus the captain
Boat/Panga Greater than 27 feet $5.00 m monthly per foot boat 
length
Up to 5 fishers plus the captain
Recreational Sports Fishing
Yacht Any size $5.00 monthly per foot boat length Up to 4 fishers plus the captain
Boat/Panga Up to 27 feet $2.50 monthly per foot boat length Up to 4 fishers plus the captain
Boat/Panga Greater than 27 feet $5.00 monthly per foot boat length Up to 5 fishers plus the captain
Others Greater than 27 feet $5.00 monthly per foot boat length Up to 4 fishers plus the captain
Scientific Fishing
Any vessel Any size $150.00 annually Depending on vessel requirements
Table 12: Proposed tariffs for Fishing Licenses in the PNC 
Source: Coiba National Park Sustainable Fish Harvesting Plan and Regulations (February, 2009). 
Note: ANAM is currently going through the final consultation phase to make these tariff changes.
Stakeholders
Public Sector Stakeholders
Name of Institution  
(Public Entity)
Role in MPA Role of Civil Servant
National Environment Authority (ANAM) Governing Agency National Director of Protected Areas. Member of 
the PNC Executive Committee.
National Environment Authority (ANAM) Governing Agency Head of Department of Protected Areas.
National Environment Authority (ANAM) Governing Agency ANAM Regional Administrator.
National Environment Authority (ANAM) Governing Agency Director of PNC.
Ministry of Government and Justice (MGJ) Decision-making advice Legal Advisor from MGJ. Member of the PNC 
Executive Committee.
National Police Security Sub-commissioner. Head of the Zone.
Panama Tourism Authority (ATP), previously 
IPAT.
Decision-making advice  ATP Lawyer. Member of the PNC Executive 
Committee.
National Science, Technology and Innovation 
Secretariat
Decision-making advice Engineer. Coordinator, Department of Science 
and Technology Indicators, SENACYT. Member of 
the PNC Executive Committee.
Panama Aquatic Resources Authority (ARAP) Decision-making advice Regional Administrator. Member of the PNC 
Executive Committee.
Montijo mayor’s office Decision-making advice Mayor. Permanent Member of the PNC  
Executive Committee.
Soná mayor’s office Decision-making advice Mayor. Permanent Member of the PNC  
Executive Committee.
Las Palmas mayor’s office Decision-making advice Mayor. Permanent Member of the PNC  
Executive Committee.
Mariato mayor’s office Decision-making advice Mayor. Permanent Member of the PNC  
Executive Committee.
National Aeronaval Service Security Coordinator
University of Panama- Veraguas Central 
Regional University (CRUV)
Decision-making advice Faculty Professor CRUV. Member of the PNC 
Executive Committee.
Table 13: Public Sector Stakeholders
20 
21
WildAid
C
os
ta
 R
ic
a
P
re
fa
ce
C
on
cl
us
io
n
P
an
am
a
C
ol
om
b
ia
E
cu
ad
or
Private Stakeholders
Analysis of Context/Governance
When Law N° 44 (2004) went into effect, a novel participatory management mechanism for the PNC 
was introduced via the creation of an Executive Committee made up of 16 representatives (of which 
only 12 have the right to vote) from State institutions and local government, civil society and scientific 
institutions. By law, the presidency of the Committee is held by ANAM, as is the administration of the 
protected area under the norms established by the Management Plan. The aforementioned Law also 
establishes a pro-bono Scientific Committee, with the objective to provide support for the Executive 
Committee on the establishment of projects and to facilitate technical assistance. In addition, a 
Commission for the Sustainable Management of Fisheries within the ZEPM, works to collaborate 
with regulating harvesting activities in the ZEPM and design policies for sustainable use and 
conservation of the marine resources present there.
Table 14: Private Sector Interests in the PNC
Stakeholder Type of Stakeholder: Public,  
Private, Community, NGO, other
Type of Attitude or Commitment to 
the Management of the MPA
Veraguas Chamber of Commerce Private Stakeholder. Member of the PNC Executive 
Board. 
Decision-making advice.
National Association for Nature Conservation 
(ANCON)
National NGO Sustainable development projects with com-
munities in the area of influence of the PNC. 
Member of the PNC Executive Board. Decision-
making advice
MarViva Foundation National NGO Collaboration with MPA auditing and elabora-
tion of sustainable development projects with 
communities in the area of influence of the PNC. 
Member of the PNC Executive Board. Decision-
making advice
Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute Scientific Research Scientist. Coordinator of the technical team 
which drew up the PNC Management Plan
Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute Scientific Research Scientist. Member of the PNC Executive Board. 
Decision-making advice.
Smithsonian Tropical Research Institute Scientific Research Scientist
National Federation of Artisanal Fishers 
(FENAPESCA)
Private Stakeholder. Member of the PNC Executive 
Board. Decision-making advice.
Foundation for the Conservation of Nature and 
Marine Species (CONMAR)
Private Conservation activities. Member of the PNC Execu-
tive Board 
Conservation International International NGO Donor for marine management projects.
Nueva Bahia Honda Association Community Association in formation Stakeholder. Carries out low impact tourism 
activities in the MPA buffer zone.
ARTURIS Community Association in formation Stakeholder. Commercial activities in the MPA 
buffer zone
Liquid Jungle Lab Private Scientific research
 Albatross Foundation National NGO Carries out sustainable development projects 
with communities in the MPA area of influence.
Center for Environmental Advocacy (CIAM) National NGO Carries out sustainable development projects 
with communities in the MPA area of influence.
The main difficulties found in terms of governance are linked to the lack of commitment on behalf 
of some of the local government representatives and also some institutional representatives in the 
Committee meetings during the period when this study was carried out (lack of participation and/
or irregular attendance). This situation is self evident upon analysis of the minutes of 27 Executive 
Committee meetings that we reviewed. During the period from November 15th, 2004 to February 
6th, 2009, there was a poor level of participation of the mayors of the districts of Montijo (37%), Río 
de Jesús (40%) and Soná (62%); all of which are in the PNC buffer zone. The Veraguas Chamber of 
Commerce displayed a similar poor level of participation (37%) and the Ministry of Government and 
Justice (66%), the latter of which has particular functions within the protected areas that need to be 
reinforced. The following graph displays participation levels. 
In contrast, there have been repeated requests to give the artisanal fishers greater representation 
in the Executive Committee, given their geographic representation. Other unresolved problems in 
the area are linked to the lack of an efficient and effective financial mechanism, and to the presence 
of the Ministry of Government and Justice, represented in the PNC by the Ecological Police. A 
detailed analysis of the Executive Committee and associated commissions is urgently required in 
order to evaluate their effectiveness, credibility among direct and indirect users, and the management 
of their financial accounts (Suman 2007). 
Several interviewees agreed that part of the problem of natural resource management is 
related to the lack of communication between agencies or administrations; to which must be 
added the confusion caused by unclear and/or contradictory legislation. From this perspective, 
Panama appears to lack an effective coordination among the different authorities that affect the 
coastal zone. This is evident from the complex relations that arise in the management of marine 
and terrestrial areas in the PNC. The Park Executive Committee , which brings together various 
government agencies, research groups, and representatives of civil society, will play a decisive 
role in the overall management framework. This will require the restructuring and training of 
personnel, along with a broad training and technical assistance program to ensure effective 
participation by all key actors in the area. Unlike other countries in the region, coastguards in 
Panama do not maintain a permanent coordinated presence in the enforcement activities of 
MPAs. This is a weakness, which could be resolved very easily.
Figure 4: Participation and attendance at the PNC Executive Committee
Alcalde / Montijo
Alcalde / Río de Jesús
Alcalde / Sona
AMP – ARAP
ANAM
ATP
Camara de Comercio
CRUZ
MARVIVA
MINGO
Sector Pesquero
SENACYT
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Surveillance and Detection
Personnel 
The current administration structure in the protected area is based, in theory, on a vertical chain of 
command with a Head of the Protected Area, two shift managers, 18 Park Wardens (9 on each 
shift) and one secretary based on the mainland in Santiago de Veraguas, 30 minutes from the port of 
Montijo. However, the PNC only has 14 Park Wardens, of which 7 are on permanent contracts. The 
Head of the Protected Area is subject not only to the authority of the ANAM Regional Administrator in 
Veraguas, but also to the directives of the Regional Head of Protected Areas, and the ANAM National 
Directorship of Protected Areas and Wildlife which can complicate their job performance. Salaries 
for personnel are on average US$300 per month. These are low and insufficient considering the 
conditions and responsibilities implicit in staying at the PNC, especially given the rise in cost of living 
over the last few years. Personnel are assigned to the PNC on shifts of 15 continuous working days, 
followed by 15 days of rest. 
Within these parameters, it is hard for the shift managers to carry out enforcement activities 
when they have to deal with the bureaucracy of issuing permits for artisanal and sports fishing, 
personnel supervision, Park entry and accommodation fees, supervision of cleaning and 
maintenance of cabins, basic services, communications, accounting, and the fortnightly 
deposits of the PNC income. It is evident that the majority of activities carried out by Park 
Wardens are administrative, as both the operation center and visitor cabins are located 
in the vicinity of the enforcement unit. In addition, there is no Employee Handbook for the 
PNC personnel or defined work programs. 
The Ecological Police maintain a reduced force at the old barracks at the Central Penal Camp at 
the Damas Bay Inlet. They collaborate with enforcement activities, but lack equipment required for 
mobilizing these additional activities. 
Training
Most Park Wardens only have basic schooling and minimal training in management techniques for 
protected areas. The only courses they may have received are:
Diving• 
First Aid• 
Outboard motor operation• 
Trail interpretation• 
Environmental education• 
Mammal identification• 
There is little training in handling high-risk situations as Park Wardens do not possess the power of 
arrest and must be accompanied by members of the Ecological Police. 
PNC Financing
It is important to note that government support for the PNC has been very limited. In effect, the lack 
of assigned resources and the difficult access to the area has translated to low or limited presence in 
the buffer zone. The PNC operation funds come primarily from the investment budget of ANAM and 
from annual investments by the Panama Ecological Trust Fund (FIDECO), administered by NATURA. 
In addition, financial support from the international community, including Conservation 
International, The United Nations Foundation, UNESCO World Heritage Center and the 
Walton Foundation, has been channeled via the Coiba Coalition Group . These funds are 
dedicated to promoting sustainable development projects in the area of influence of the 
PNC and to support protection and management of the protected area.
One last outstanding figure is the annual income for PNC in 2008, which reached US$259,124, from 
cabin rentals, visitor entry fees, anchor fees, sports fishing permits and other activities (ANAM 2008). 
Law N° 44 (2004) establishes the PNC Fund with the objective to carry out the responsibilities stated 
in the law. This fund should be used for investment and administration costs of the PNC, with special 
emphasis on projects related to management, protection and conservation. The estimated cost of 
implementing the PNC Management Plan under a minimum-funding scenario is US$13.7 million over 
the next five years. It is clear that there is a huge gap between the budgeted costs and the availability 
of funds. 
Detection Probability
Enforcement Vessels and Applied Technology
The PNC has six “coastal” vessels for transport and patrolling, each with their respective 
outboard motors. Although PNC personnel claim that only one vessel was not operational 
when this study was carried out, the residents of the buffer zone informed us that only one 
ANAM vessel was patrolling the area. The size of the ANAM vessels in the PNC range from 
26 to 30 feet and their top speeds are between 12 and 40 knots. In addition to these, there 
is also a marine patrol team provided by MarViva, made up of three additional vessels. The 
ANAM patrol vessels are inactive for most of the year, due to the lack of a repair budget, 
which is why the collaboration of the MarViva vessels is so important. 
 
Source
 
Total (US$)2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
FIDECO $20,000 $23,000 $36,682 $60,375 $69,277 $60,000 $156,400 $425,734
ANAM $67,800 $67,800 $67,800 $12,478 $45,000 $61,000 $60,744 $382,622
TOTAL $87,800 $90,800 $104,482 $72,853 $114,277 $121,000 $217,144 $808,356
Table 15: PNC Finances 2002-2008
Institution Contribution (US$)
STRI $40,000
Fundación Natura $7,700
Fundación MarViva $558,000
ANCON $10,267
Conservation International $90,000
UNESCO/CI/UNF $28,000
TOTAL $733,967
Table 16: External support for PNC management, 2008
"A la carte” menu
In the past, some Park Wardens have even 
offered overnight visitors the chance to choose 
their meals from fish or animals caught and 
cooked by the very people who have the legal 
obligation to protect them. 
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Only one of the vessels, the Coral V, is suitable for interception; the remaining vessels are more 
suited to monitoring or logistical activities. The MarViva vessels must be added to these. The 
replacement of one of the slower vessels with a high-speed one is required, along with greater 
coordination with the MarViva vessels. Encompassing all these, the main problem is still the 
need for constant vessel maintenance.
Of all the equipment we were asked to investigate (radar, HF, VHF and UHF communications, 
night vision equipment, satellite phones, video and photographic cameras), the PNC vessels 
only possessed one video camera and two photographic cameras. Park Wardens did not 
even have basic field and personal safety equipment. Apart from uniforms and field boots, 
there is no camping gear, compasses, personal radios, binoculars, GPS or other individual 
equipment or first aid supplies. 
Organization and Planning for Patrols 
The Panamian authorities do not have enough resources to cover the territorial sea and exclusive 
economic zone. The main reason for this is that there are not enough patrol boats, and for those that 
they possess, there are not enough resources to ensure that they are operational. In most cases, 
they only patrol areas in the vicinity of their operations base. Even when vessels and fuel are available, 
there are not enough personnel to operate them.
In general terms, the organization of enforcement activities is poor. In many cases before 2007 it is 
hard to find records of the number of vessels visiting the protected area and, as we mentioned earlier, 
the Park Director spends much of his time carrying out administrative tasks. As a result, there is a 
lack of reliable information on the fishing fleets operating within the PNC, landings, and fishing efforts. 
Along with the poor capacity of the authorities to patrol the fishing zones, and the lack of information 
on the biology of exploited species, these all have created unfavorable conditions for the appropriate 
management of marine resources in the PNC.
There is a lack of political will on behalf of the government authorities to enforce the existing 
regulations or to provide the proper resources to carry out these activities. The illegal gear 
used by artisanal fishers are net traps which capture juvenile shrimp and fish at the mouths of 
estuaries; and industrial vessels trawl in areas close to the coast. Both are negatively impacting 
the sustainability of fisheries. Finally, there is also a sense of impunity among those involved in 
fishing activities who feel that they do not need to comply with existing regulations. This contributes 
greatly to a lack of compliance or acceptance of control methods. 
Electronic Monitoring Systems for Vessels in Panama 
In 2007 a law was passed which obliges boat owners to place satellite-monitoring equipment 
on their vessels so that ARAP might improve their control of the territorial waters. As a result, 
the state institution would be able to determine who is carrying out fishing activities in closed 
areas or areas other than those authorized. However, the implementation of this law has 
been delayed on various occasions as vessel owners have not installed the equipment and 
have not been sanctioned as a result. This is not only an issue of illegal fishing and resource 
management within the PNC, but involves national security interests and over 300 vessels 
registered in Panama, which are dedicated to fishing in national waters, and another 180 
dedicated to fishing in international waters. 
Analysis of Detection Probability
Coiba National Park covers an area of 785 square nautical miles in the reserve zone, and 468.58 in the 
Special Protection Zone, which give a total area of 1,254.49 nm2.
According to the equation defined at the beginning of this publication, detection probability should be 
estimated with the following site conditions and patrol strategy:
Sweep width: 6 to 10 miles visual and 8-16 nautical miles by X Bandwidth navigation radar for small 
vessel detection. 
Distance covered: Variable between 50 and 450 nautical miles.
Area to explore: 1,243.49 nm2.
Under these parameters, the detection probability is as follows:
If we consider a patrol velocity of ten knots using small vessels, it is clear that the efficiency is poor 
even when patrol operations cover 100 nm (that is approximately ten hours of patrolling), which is not 
recommended for small vessels. In order to achieve a detection probability of greater than 75%, a 
vessel would need to cover between 120 and 180 miles, between 12 and 18 hours of patrolling, and 
have equipment able to detect other vessels at distances greater than 12-16 miles (the other vessels 
would have to be very large).
On the other hand, the speedboats available are made of fiberglass. In order to cover the area in a timely 
manner patrols need to be planned with the simultaneous use of two vessels; one active, and the other 
one as backup to cover for maintenance issues. It is important to incorporate an autonomous oceanic 
vessel that can operate at sea for several days. The maximum detection distance is smaller for a wooden 
or artisanal vessel, making detection even more difficult, especially as it is mostly done on a visual basis. 
Table 17: Detection Probability in the PNC
Coiba MPA – Panama 
           Maximum Effective Detection Distance nm
 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
30 13.48% 17.55% 21.44% 25.14% 28.66% 32.02% 35.23% 38.28%
40 17.55% 22.69% 27.51% 32.02% 36.26% 40.23% 43.96% 47.45%
50 21.44% 27.51% 33.11% 38.28% 43.05% 47.45% 51.51% 55.25%
60 25.14% 32.02% 38.28% 43.96% 49.11% 5 3.79% 58.04% 61.90%
70 28.66% 36.26% 43.05% 49.11% 54.53% 59.37% 63.70% 67.56%
80 32.02% 40.23% 47.45% 53.79% 59.37% 64.28% 68.59% 72.38%
90 35.23% 43.96% 51.51% 58.04% 63.70% 68.59% 72.82% 76.49%
100 38.28% 47.45% 55.25% 61.90% 67.56% 72.38% 76.49% 79.98%
110 41.18% 50.72% 58.71% 65.41% 71.02% 75.72% 79.65% 82.95%
120 43.96% 53.79% 61.90% 68.59% 74.10% 78.65% 82.40% 85.49%
130 46.60% 56.67% 64.85% 71.48% 76.86% 81.23% 84.77% 87.64%
140 49.11% 59.37% 67.56% 74.10% 79.32% 83.49% 86.82% 89.48%Di
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In conclusion, effective enforcement of this area requires at least three vessels and a crew of 9-12 
men for onboard tasks. This is currently only available through the support of MarViva and other 
organizations. If a future budget permits, an oceanic vessel with a crew requirement of four to six 
men should be incorporated. As we mentioned earlier, the PNC has a serious vessel maintenance 
problem that must be urgently addressed. We do not recommend adding new vessels until this 
problem is solved. 
In the area located en route to the mainland, oceanic vessels are not required. Rather, rapid response 
speedboats would be more appropriate in contrast to the needs of the ocean side of the protected area. 
We also recommend the addition of land-based radar and the use of boats only for interception. This 
would also reduce recurrent costs for fuel and the need for backup crews.
Interception and Arrest
According to the Park Wardens, the most common violations in the PNC are boats, which do not 
carry the corresponding fishing permits to carry out the activity in the protected area, or which do 
not use permitted fishing gear. All the ANAM vessels are coastal, and only the Coral V (besides the 
MarViva boats) can reach a high enough maximum speed in order to intercept other vessels (40 
knots). In contrast, interviews carried out with managers of processing plants with their respective 
warehouses, show that the fishing fleets of both processing plants operated within park borders 
(Vega, 2006), and even provided estimated annual catches of around 360,000 pounds, assuming 
that each shipment to Miami airport is approximately 10,000 to 15,000 pounds (Maté et al, 2007). 
However, there is not enough information to confidently estimate the total commercial value of 
industrial fishing in the zone. 
It is highly probable that areas within, and surrounding the PNC are susceptible to overfishing. This 
affects both the fragile habitats of the marine protected area and the new species that are being 
reported by scientists. In fact, just as in other areas of the country, fishers perceive a huge 
increase in the number of boats over the last few years, which they believe is the cause of 
the decline in fish populations. Finally, although industrial fishing in Coiba is prohibited according 
to current law; the activity is carried out in the adjacent ZEPM.
Note: One of the main problems reported by commercial (“artisanal”) fishers is the presence of shrimp 
fishers and artisanal trawlers who operate in areas close to the coast and carry out industrial fishing in 
areas where they are not permitted. The percentage of catch coming from the Gulf of Chiriqui is unknown, 
but the reduction in average size seems to indicate possible overexploitation.
Boarding Procedure and Crime Scene Investigation
There is rarely a detailed investigation and compilation of evidence at the crime scene as training 
and preparation are almost non-existent. However, many of the processes initiated do end with 
a sanction. Perhaps this is because the violations are obvious and the violators do not possess 
the resources to hire lawyers who can find errors in the investigative procedures. 
MarViva does not report illegal activities within the Park; it simply informs ANAM as part of its 
collaboration. However, strong economic interests exist and so does impunity for an owner 
of several vessels that have been caught repeatedly violating the PNC regulations. To date, 
this person has not been sanctioned and it was not even possible for us to see the files of the 
case(s) which has (or have) been brought against him. One of the members of his consortium is 
also part of the ARAP Board of Directors. 
MarViva recently published a document that provides guidelines for boarding operations. In addition, 
based on Resolution AG-0118-2005 (February 24th 2005), which empowers ANAM Park Wardens 
to board and inspect vessels which request permission to fish or are fishing in the PNC, it appears 
that the process employed is as follows:
The captain is requested permission to board.1. 
They are required to show their sport fishing or artisanal fishing permit, and if 2. 
they do not have one, the vessel is taken outside the Park boundaries.
The containers are inspected to verify whether they contain marine products 3. 
that are not permitted inside the Park (shark fins, lobster, conch).
The fishing gear is inspected to ensure that the number of hooks, buoys etc 4. 
correspond to the permit. 
Correct Presentation of Documents to the Administrative or Judicial Sanction Process
The procedures used to compile and manage evidence on the vessels were published in 
an enforcement handbook produced by ANAM with the support of the National Police and 
MarViva. If a vessel is detected committing a sports fishing or artisanal fishing violation 
within the PNC limits, the fishing gear and the catch are seized, and the process is filmed 
and photographed. Following this, a violation report is filled, along with sworn statements, 
and these are sent to the PNC offices at Veraguas, so that the Legal Department can 
give instructions on the following legal procedures. The catch is weighed and donated to 
schools or charity organizations in the vicinity of the PNC. 
Relation between Violations Detected and Intercepted
Some communities have reported irregularities in the PNC. However, in most cases they complain 
that they have reported violations to the authority but nothing has been done. It must be noted that 
in some cases it is the local communities that commit the violations. There are no official records of 
this and our investigation had to be based on stakeholder opinions.
Conflicts of Interest
Industrial vessels belonging to a member of the ARAP Board of Directors were captured within the PNC limits 
on more than one occasion. ARAP is the same authority that sanctions illegal fishing outside protected areas. 
This situation angers environmental organizations and even fishing cooperatives, who have found that their 
complaints fall on deaf ears. It is important to note also that the local newspapers make constant references 
to foreign vessels, even those from Costa Rica, which enter and fish in Coiba. 
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Prosecution
Speed and Efficiency of Administrative Processes
Although the ANAM Administrator can apply sanctions of up to US$1 million, and the National 
Environmental Board can impose fines of up to US$10 million, the sanctions normally applied in these 
cases range from US$25 to US$300, and reach a maximum of US$1,500 only in a few cases.
Speed and Efficiency of Administrative Processes 
There is not a lot of experience in the application of the penal code for violations within the PNC. 
Four cases, which fall under the penal system, have been detected. Although proceedings were 
initiated over two years ago, none have received sanctions to date. One of these cases has been 
provisionally dismissed due to the lack of evidence in proving that a crime was actually committed. 
Proportion of Unresolved Cases 
Over the study period we found a total of 43 cases, of which nine are still under investigation (initiated 
between July 2008 and May 2009), two have been shelved due to lack of evidence and three have 
been concluded, but the violator has not been located. In the latter events, this has implied an average 
of US$225 in uncollected fines. The remaining processes have all been concluded with fines that have 
been paid, with the exception of one case which was not penalized because the sharks captured 
were for scientific purposes.
Year No. Open 
Cases
No. Solved 
Cases
No. Cases 
pending
Time (in days) to process cases (average)  
and comments
2004 2 1 0 • Settled after 21 months 
• 1 shelved due to lack of evidence
2005 5 3 0 • 1 shelved due to lack of evidence  
• Shelved because accused could not be located 
• 3 settled after 1-4 months, with fines of $500, 
$1,000 and $1,500.
2006 6 5 0 • 5 settled after 4-16 months 
• 1 shelved for scientific reasons
2007 9 9 0 • 6 settled in 1 month 
• 2 settled in 4 months 
• 1 settled in 5 months 
• Fines between $100 - $300
2008 18 9 9 • 9 settled between 1-5 months 
• 9 pending between 6 -12 months
2009 3 0 3 • Cases opened between March and May
Table 18: Summary of PNC Processed Cases
Proportion of Cases Presented and Cases Admitted
All cases presented to the administrative or judicial authorities are accepted, although evidently not 
all result in a sanction.
Monitoring Penal Processes
Although the Authorities may participate in the processes, they tend to wait until the investigating 
organism requests copies of documentation or further information regarding evidence, without really 
taking an active role during investigations.
Sanctions and Sentencing
Ratio of Processes Initiated and Sentences
Of the 43 processes initiated between 2004 and 2009, 32 culminated in a resolution (an 
effectiveness of 74.4%). Of these, 28 ended with sanctions, one was absolved and three 
of the accused were unable to be located, so the fine was not paid. Real effectiveness was 
therefore 65.11%.
Length of Process
Some processes (9 out of 43) are still being investigated, even though several were started over two 
years ago.
Sanctions Implemented
Of the sanctions imposed, three have not been carried out because the guilty parties have 
not been located, while the other six are in the process of being implemented. The rest of 
the fines were collected by ANAM. There are a total of 43 cases, either completed or under 
investigation by ANAM for alleged environmental violations, two of which were initialized by 
means of citizen complaints.
Flagrant Impunity
Fishers who have reported the use of illegal fishing gear have seen how their complaints fall on deaf ears as 
the fishing gear is returned to the violators, they are not sanctioned, and return to continue fishing illegally 
the next day.
In 2005, the Penal Code of the Republic of Panama was substantially modified. A new heading, “Offenses against 
the Environment” was incorporated, which outlined sanctions for persons who promote, cause, sponsor or direct 
damaging activities to the environment, causing them to be disqualified from holding a public position for three 
years. In addition, Article 401 stipulates sanctions for persons who fish, hunt, kill, capture or extract protected or 
threatened marine and terrestrial wildlife species or resources without the appropriate permits or, in the case that 
a permit is held, if the conditions of the permit (size, amounts, age) are not met.
30
31
WildAid
C
os
ta
 R
ic
a
P
re
fa
ce
C
on
cl
us
io
n
P
an
am
a
C
ol
om
b
ia
E
cu
ad
or
Recommendations
Coiba National Park, Panama
Surveillance and Detection
Critical Aspect Limited personnel, low salaries.
Recommendation 1) Employ another 9 to 12 Park Wardens as permanent 
crew for patrol vessels. 
2) Salaries should be evaluated to determine whether 
their levels are in agreement with State salaries, and if 
they are below, they should be raised and standardized. 
Evaluate the possibility of providing additional per-diem.
Feasibility Medium. Requires commitment of the PNC to cover the 
costs in the long term as a budget item.
Estimated Cost 1) $43,200 to $57,600 per year for additional personnel 
2) Between $15,000 and $18,000 to improve salaries of 
current personnel.
Critical Aspect Institutional weakness of PNC.
Recommendation Produce organization, roles and procedures handbooks 
and implement a Human Resources development and 
training plan.
Feasibility High. ANAM is interested and it could be implemented 
rapidly.
Estimated Cost US$50,000 and twelve months of work to include a 
definitions phase (4 months) and a follow up phase 
(8 months).
Critical Aspect Low vessel availability due to poor maintenance.
Recommendation Establish an Assistance or Support Agreement with 
NGOs to obtain funds to hire a permanent mechanic, 
tools and spare parts for existing vessels.
Feasibility There is political will. The cost-benefit ratio of this action 
is optimal.
Estimated Cost USD $60,000 per year.
Critical Aspect Lack of surveillance equipment (boat fittings, detection 
equipment, binoculars, GPS, radios, survival kits, etc).
Recommendation 1) Improve budget distribution. 
2) Develop agreements with friendly governments 
and NGOs. 
3) Install a radar station on the island operated by ANAM 
and coastguards.
Feasibility 1) High. This could be managed by means of a donation 
and PNC counterpart funds. 
2) Requires greater authority given to Park Wardens 
and coordination with other State agencies.
Estimated Cost 1) US$50,000. 
2) No cost. 
3) $60,000.
Surveillance and Detection (cont.) 
Critical Aspect ANAM does not participate in the electronic monitoring 
of vessels.
Recommendation Agree with the Maritime Authority that ANAM can have 
access to electronic surveillance.
Feasibility Medium. This apparently needs to be carried out but the 
fishing industry does not want to be controlled.
Estimated Cost US$225,000 in equipment and training to establish 
a parallel Monitoring Center in case the Maritime 
Authority does not grant shared use of its resources. 
Critical Aspect Lack of infrastructure for Park Wardens (no 
control posts).
Recommendation Financial investment for at least two control posts.
Feasibility High. There is interest from ANAM.
Estimated Cost US$50,000.
Critical Aspect Lack of awareness in neighboring communities
Recommendation Begin awareness campaigns with community  
organizations involved with the PNC.
Feasibility High but must be linked to an awareness of the benefits 
to the community, which is derived from the  
management of the area.
Estimated Cost US$70,000.
Critical Aspect Limitations in operational budgets and rules for 
expenditure. 
No financial autonomy.
Recommendation 1) Design a plan to raise funds directly for the PNC 
(regulate tariffs, donations, State assignation etc) and 
implement regulations for its administration. 
2) Provide the PNC with sufficient autonomy to cover 
minimum operational funds with activities (tourism, 
diving, fishing).  
3) Create a trust fund.
Feasibility Medium. Needs to go through political channels.
Estimated Cost US$35,000 to cover costs of advisors, transport and 
technical assistance.
Prosecution (cont.)
Critical Aspect Overlapping or insufficient regulations.
Recommendation Review of existing legislation and preparation/presen-
tation of legal initiatives to fill gaps (diving, coral reef 
fish, etc), as well as assigning responsibilities and 
decision-making level to those involved.
Feasibility Medium. Specialized international organizations, friendly 
governments and NGOs should be called upon to support 
the initiative.
Estimated Cost US$ 50,000 to cover the cost of consultancies, staff 
training and trips which will permit the design of legal 
needs.
Critical Aspect Head of PNC has limited authority, command and 
jurisdiction.
Recommendation Assign greater administrative-operational decision 
powers.
Train group director to improve his position as an 
authority and generate respect for his position.
Feasibility High.
Estimated Cost Negligible costs. 
Critical Aspect Fisheries Authority, made up of members of the sector, 
block sanctioning processes.
Recommendation 1) Re-constitute the Board of Directors with a 
government majority or at least that of institutions re-
lated to fisheries management rather than delegates 
from the sector.
2) Choose representative cases and launch dis-
semination campaign among the community until it 
is reformed.
Feasibility Low. Reforms to the Law and political will of the Central 
Government are required.
Estimated Cost 1) Political costs.
2) US$75,000.
Critical Aspect Impunity: slow provision of justice or loss of cases.
Recommendation 1) Establish a program of legal assistance for the PNC 
and ANAM which permits prosecution of cases as a 
support to the administrative authority or as a public or 
private plaintiff.
2) Fishing gear should be confiscated and destroyed in 
administrative cases. 
3) Allow the MPA Director to impose administrative 
sanctions.
Feasibility Medium. ANAM would be interested, implementation is 
simple, and results would be immediate. However, the 
action would generate a response from those affected, 
and a political reaction should also be expected.
Estimated Cost 1) US $30,000 per year to hire an ANAM lawyer.
2) No cost.
3) US$15,000.
Interception and Arrest
Critical Aspect No permanent presence of coastguards to support 
enforcement in the PNC.
Recommendation Agreement and Operational Procedures between 
ANAM and Coastguards.
Feasibility Medium. Requires facilitation, which could be provided 
by an NGO.
Estimated Cost USD$20,000 to US$25,000 for a 6-9 month process.
Critical Aspect Poor Park Warden training.
Recommendation Coherent and integrated training of Park Wardens 
and national police who work in the Park, following 
international recommendations and minimum required 
courses for the execution of these functions and for work 
at sea. Special emphasis should be placed on boarding 
procedures and crime scene investigation. 
Feasibility Medium. ANAM should be involved to promote these 
activities on a permanent basis. External assistance or 
professional exchanges may be required to accelerate 
the learning curve. These could be arranged via NGOs 
and friendly governments.
Estimated Cost US$45,000. Cost depends on courses, trips and 
seminars required according to market prices or NGO or 
Government support.
Critical Aspect Lack of independence in the secretariat of the PNC 
Executive Committee.
Recommendation Separate appointment of the Committee members, in 
order to obtain greater management independence 
Launch campaign to raise awareness and create 
citizen pressure and political will. 
Feasibility Low, due to the current lack of political will
Very important action (for example, ANAM occupies 
the Presidency of the Committee, and MarViva is the 
secretary).
Estimated Cost US$80,000.
Critical Aspect Lack of capacity to monitor processes underway.
Recommendation 1) Hire a lawyer and/or agreements with eduactional 
centers (universities).
2) Explore possibility for NGOs to follow up cases or 
present private accusations.
Feasibility High, especially for cooperation agreements with Law 
Schools (internships).
Estimated Cost US$40,000.
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Description of the Islands 
The Malpelo Fauna and Flora Sanctuary (SFF), located 500 km to the west of Buenaventura, 
in the Pacific Ocean, has a terrestrial area of 3.5 km2 and a marine area of 9,584 km2. This rocky 
archipelago is made up of Malpelo Island and eleven islets, and possesses important coral 
formations and significant marine biodiversity. It was declared a Fauna and Flora Sanctuary 
(SFF) in 1995; demarcated by a square centered on Malpelo Island and radiating outwards 
for 25 nautical miles to each axis. In 2006, Malpelo was declared a UNESCO World Natural 
Heritage Site, and was placed on the IMO list of Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas (PSSA) in 
2002. There are no nearby ports or coastal communities. The only inhabitants of the island 
are Navy, SFF, and Malpelo Foundation staff, along with volunteers and occasional visits 
from tourists who come to scuba dive. 
Gorgona National Natural Park (PNN), located at 56 kilometers off the coast of Guapi in the Pacific 
Ocean, spans a total area of 61,687.5 hectares (Gorgona, Gorgonilla and marine area), of which 598.36 
km2 correspond to the marine area. The site possesses a small example of tropical rainforest with a 
diversity of coral formations and presence of migratory species. Nearby communities are located on the 
north coast of the Nariño Department, and along the coast of the Guapi Municipality. Prevailing marine 
currents are south to north with strong winds occurring in the latter half of the year. Transport is via boat 
from Buenaventura (12 hours) or Guapi (90 minutes).
Socioeconomic Value 
Malpelo Tourism: Seven dive tour boats currently operate at Malpelo SFF, of which three are based 
in Buenaventura (M/N María Patricia, M/N Doña Mariela, M/N Anita) and have a capacity for 10-25 
scuba divers and autonomy of 12 to 25 days. A further two Panamanian boats and two Costa Rican 
vessels operate with an autonomy of 15 and 30 days, and a capacity for 8 and 18 divers. Another 
Costa Rican vessel was expected to start operations at Malpelo before the end of 2009. There is a 
set of Regulations for the Use of the Area (which went through a prior consultation process) that  
establishes that only one vessel may be present at the island at any given time. Dive tourism is 
characterized as being exclusive and expensive: the average cost per 12-day visit is US$3,500. 
Approximately 600 people visit the island each year and pay US$60,000 in park entry fees.
Gorgona Tourism: Gorgona Island previously housed a penitentiary. The Gorgona PNN has given 
tourist concessions to the following tour operators: Aviatur, Malpelo Foundation and Avia. The park 
entry fee is collected directly by National Natural Parks, in accordance with the official established 
tariffs. In recent years accommodation on the island has improved, resulting in an increased entry 
fee. There are social programs for people with low income, especially school groups, and various 
package tours are offered. Access to the island is via two vessels that leave from the port of Guapi 
and a timber boat, which leaves port at Buenaventura. Around 4,500 people visit Gorgona PNN 
each year.
Malpelo Fauna and Flora Sanctuary  
and Gorgona National Natural Park 
Colombia
Description of the Colombian Fishing Fleet : Fishing can be either industrial or artisanal. There 
are approximately 15,000 artisanal fishers in the Pacific. The most common gear used are nets for 
whitefish and shrimp (beach seines, trammel nets, cast nets), longlines and handlines for whitefish, 
used in vessels up to 15 meters long which in some cases have navigation equipment that give 
them an autonomy of up to two weeks. According to the report we consulted, industrial fishing in the 
Pacific began in the 1950s, for tuna and shallow water shrimp, both of which became important in 
the eighties. 
In 2006, the Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development and the Colombia International 
Corporation (CCI) produced a report on fishing and aquaculture, which contained the 
following information: “The catches recorded and landed in the four Pacific municipalities, 
along with tuna and whitefish landings at Cartagena and Barranquilla caught in the Eastern Pacific 
Oean (EPO) for 2007 were 78,205 metric tonnes, corresponding to a decline of 9.4% with respect 
to 2006 (86,277.77 tonnes). Industrial fishing made up 74,006t (94.6% of the total) whereas 
artisanal fishing accounted for 4,199.5t (5.3%). Fisheries in 2007 totaled 76,527.5t, a decline of 
8.6%, whereas crustacean products declined by 34% with respect to 2006 (1,659t). The artisanal 
catch (4,199.5t) was made up of 47 species. 51.5% of this (2,162.2t) was landed at Buenaventura, 
and 36% (1,520.6t) at Tumaco; these volumes showed an increase of 18.2% with respect to 2006.
Figure 5: Contribution of Fishing to Colombia’s national GDP Figure 6: Fish Landings. Colombia National Register
Fish
Crustacean
Mollusk
Artisanal and Industial Fish Landings Colombian  
Pacific Ocean 1995–2006: Average 87860 tonnes/year 
(statistics INPA, INCODER, ICA)
Fraction of GDP represented by national 
fisheries 2000–2007  
(estadísticas DANE)
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In the case of Gorgona PNN there is illegal artisanal fishing, as the Bazán community is authorized to 
transit through the marine protected area because they fish in two areas near the Park. This fishing 
community can be characterized as follows:
In the case of Malpelo SFF, as it is an island area with a huge biological and tourist value, it is impacted 
by a different set of activities:
Gorgona
Estimated population 40 – 58 (there is no fisher register) 
Estimated number of vessels 15 – 22 registered at the port of Buenaventura
Gear used Trammel nets, longlines and traps
Target species Shark (dogfish and hammerheads), groupers, turtles, 
balloonfish
Fisher organizations/cooperatives Since 2004 only one cooperative – Pescactiva – it 
has more or less 25 fishers
Main ports Guapi and Buenaventura
Table 19: Gorgona fishing community
Table 20: Illegal Activities detected at Malpelo MPA 
Source: Enforcement Handbook for Colombian authorities in the Malpelo Fauna and Flora Sanctuary, 2006
Malpelo
Type of fishery and/or activity Vessel type utlized Approximate crew size Approximate time of fishing
Free diving Pangas from 12-30 feet 
Outboard motors : 25-40 HP 
Speed: 6-8 knots
3 persons 7 am – 1 pm
Diving with tanks or compressor Pangas from 12-30 feet 
Outboard motors: 25-40 HP 
Speed: 6-8 knots
3-5 persons 7 am – 1 pm 
5 pm – 10 pm
Sports fishing Yachts from 50-70 feet 
Speed: 15-30 knots
4-6 persons 7 am – 4 pm 
7am – 1 pm
Camaroneros, Atuneros, Pesca 
Blanca 
Fishing boats  
Speed: 8 knots
6- 20 persons 24 horas
Line fishing Pangas from 12 to 20 feet 
Outoboard motors 25 HP 
Speed: 6-8 knots
4-5 persons 8 am – 3 pm
Longliners surface deployment 
or up to 10 fathoms  
Use currents to fish
Vessels between 32-40 feet 
Speed: 8-10 knots
5 persons Gear is set at 3 – 4 pm 
Gear is drawn in at 10 pm
Trammel nets Pangas from 12-30 feet 
Outboard motors: 25-40 HP 
Speed: 6-8 knots
3 persons Gear is set at 5pm 
Gear is drawn in at 5 am: 
12 horas
Analysis of Context / Governance:
There are a range of legal dispositions in Colombia which are applicable to marine protected areas. 
These involve several state entities directly, and several NGOs and local communities indirectly. The 
highest environmental authority is the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development 
(MAVDT), which creates policies on the environment and biodiversity. The marine protected areas of 
Gorgona PNN and Malpelo SFF are managed directly by the Special Administration Unit of National 
Natural Parks (UAESPNN), which is a branch of the MAVDT. These marine protected areas do not 
have a complete administrative autonomy per se. However, it is important to note that the National 
Natural Parks Directorate operates out of territorial offices under the coordination of the UAESPNN, 
and in the case of the marine protected areas of the Pacific, are under the direction of the Southwest 
Territorial Office, which has its headquarters in Cali. The marine protected areas respond to legal 
environmental frameworks, but in terms of enforcement, authority is passed to the National Navy.  
The Territorial Office in Cali approves all logistical issues. 
There are certain institutional inconsistencies in the issue of fishing authorities. The Colombian 
Institute for Rural Development (INCODER) was the fisheries authority in the country for several 
years. In 2007, the Law for Rural Development was passed and this function was handed over 
to the Colombian Agriculture & Livestock Institute (ICA), under which was created the Fisheries 
and Aquaculture Section. However, last year this resolution was declared unenforceable by the 
Constitutional Court, resulting in the immediate devolution of powers to INCODER. Through-
out 2009, ICA has retained its functions, through interinstitutional agreements between the 
two entities. There is therefore a significant institutional instability which has resulted in negative 
impacts on the development of the fishing industry as well as scientific research, closed seasons, 
minimum landing sizes, target species, quotas and the enforcement of sovereignty over the 
marine resources in the Colombian EEZ. In this context, the management of quotas, species, 
fishing areas and sanctions have all fallen under the influence of the large fishery interests.
With respect to sanctions and the management of confiscated products or gear from illegal 
fishing, there is a conflict of authorities between National Parks and INCODER, because both 
are empowered to impose sanctions for the same violations regarding illegal fishing in the MPA. 
National Parks does not have the logistical capacity to manage cargos of confiscated fish, so 
this should be assumed by INCODER, who also has the responsibility of auctioning confiscated 
products. National Parks does not have the authority to seize fishing gear or vessels – this must 
be carried out by the Navy, who generally do not like to do so, due to the high costs of maintaining 
a vessel at the Malaga Naval Base, where vessels are usually held.
Ministry of Environment, 
Housing and Territorial 
Development
Deputy Ministrer of Environment
Special Administration Unit of 
National Natural Park Systems
Southwest Territorial  
Directorate
Gorgona PNN
Malpelo SSF
Figure 7: Structure of the Ministry of Environment, Housing and Territorial Development
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In terms of administrative sanctions, there is a corresponding legal framework (Decree 216, [2003] – 
Administrative Restructuring of the Ministry of Environment), which establishes the composition of judges 
and legislators for preliminary hearing and higher courts:
Local: PNN or SFF Administration• 
Regional: Southwest Territorial Directorate (DT, Cali Offices, Valle del Cauca)• 
National: General Director (Offices in Bogotá, D.C.)• 
Each level performs as a complementary administrative instance. In penal cases the Central Level 
is the second instance when the DT is the first instance. The DT imposes sanctions at the second 
instance (appeals) when the area or local program becomes the first instance. It is evident that the 
decentralization of the administration is not working in practice, because the capacity and responsibility 
over confiscated materials have not been delegated to the environmental authority. 
Stakeholders 
Public Sector Stakeholders
Private Sector Stakeholders
Table 22: Private Sector stakeholders, Malpelo and Gorgona
Stakeholder Type of Stakeholder:  
Public, Private, Community, 
NGO, other
Type of Attitude or Commitment to the 
Management of the MPA
Andi- Acodiarpe, Buenaventura Fishing Group Group of private fishing businesses Organization of boat owners. Against the MPA
Industrial Fishing Sector Private Are not aligned with the conservation of the MPA
Tour Operators Private Supports MPA
Pescativa, artisanal fishers Community Supports MPA
Bahía Cupica Community Supports MPA
Fundación Malpelo NGO Collaborates actively with MPA
Conservation International NGO Collaborates actively with MPA
Name of Institution  
(Public Entity)
Role in MPA Role of Civil Servant
Ministry of Environment, Housing and  
Territorial Development
Environmental Authority Director of Ecosystems
National Natural Parks – Northwest Region Administration and Management Head of Gorgona
National Natural Parks – Northwest Region Administration and Management Head of Malpelo
National Navy – Marine General Directorate Surveillance and control Commander ARC Sula 
DIMAR/IMO Port captains Port Captain
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sovereignty of interior waters Environmental Affairs
Ministry of Defence Surveillance and control Defense Minister, Navy Commander, Coastguard 
Commander
Colombian Commission for the Ocean Advisor to the National Government Director
Table 21: Public Sector Stakeholders, Malpelo and Gorgona
Surveillance and Detection
Malpelo: Personnel
In Malpelo SFF there is a manned National Navy post consisting of a lieutenant (occasionally), an 
officer and four marines who are rotated every month. The Navy supports the management of the 
area with eight crew members on board the ARC Sula. Logistical limitations prevent enforcement of 
the area reaching desirable levels of coverage and efficiency. There are insufficient personnel at 
National Parks. This situation is partially resolved with personnel from Fundación Malpelo (two 
 workers who support the administration of the protected area) through a cooperative agreement 
between PNN and Fundación Malpelo, and with Navy personnel. 
Fundación Malpelo has five biologists and two staff members who support the management of 
the MPA. There is a program for education, training, and equipment for marine Park Wardens. 
A program to manage marine and land based human resources has been developed. Monthly 
salaries range from US$1,350 and US$1,500 (COL $ 2,500,000 y 3,000,000).
Gorgona: Personnel
There are barely sufficient personnel if we sum the core staff (7) and personnel on fixed contracts 
(15). The latter depend on the existing cooperation projects in the area and from resources from the 
National Environment Fund (FONAM). The selection process contemplates the need for personnel 
with maritime experience. However, there is a lack of training and preparation in enforcement 
procedures. They are only able to dedicate 30% of their time to control and patrolling as the rest of 
the time they are implementing the area’s management plan. As in Malpelo, marine enforcement 
falls under the jurisdiction of the Navy, with the vessels it uses to patrol the Pacific Ocean. 
Enforcement Vessels and Applied Technology
Malpelo: Since 2006, with the agreement signed between the Navy, Colombia National Natural 
Parks, Conservation International (Colombia) and Fundación Malpelo, the vessel ARC Sula is on 
permanent patrol. This vessel has autonomy of 4,000 nautical miles and a top speed of 18 knots. 
In addition to control and protection activities, it also carries out studies and scientific research 
activities. ARC Sula has radio and radar equipment, satellite phone, GPS, VHF, marine bandwidth 
UHF, video and photographic cameras. There is no night vision equipment. Coverage of the area 
is not 100% due to mechanical problems that arise on the vessel, and the lack of a backup. 
The availability is about 80%, but recently, technical failings and maintenance requirements have 
forced the boat out of service. There is a 1500-model Frigate, which has autonomy of 8,000 
nautical miles at 14 knots, but it is not a cost-effective vessel for this type of operation. 
Education and Dissemination
Malpelo: In Malpelo SFF, the environmental 
education program is designed and imple-
mented by Fundación Malpelo. The focus 
is oriented towards raising awareness 
through presentations and videos to differ-
ent audiences, from local to international, 
and through scientific expeditions.
Gorgona: In the case of Gorgona PNN, 
within the environmental education plan, 
which is implemented directly by Park 
staff, a forum has been generated with 
stakeholders and visitors to socialize legal 
dispositions and regulations applied in 
the PNN. 
2010 Budget SFF Malpelo PNN Gorgona
Capital Investment US$50,000 US$178,000
Opperations US$70,000 US$150,000
External Cooperations (estimated) US$500,000 US$200,000
TOTAL $620,000 US$528,000
Table 23: Budget for Malpelo and Gorgona
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Gorgona: The Park has two coastal vessels: one is 25 feet long with two 100 hp motors and a top 
speed of 27 knots, while the other is a water taxi 20 feet in length with two 40 hp outboard motors and 
a top speed of 16 knots. Maintenance is not effective, and at the time of this study, the water taxi was 
out of service. Both boats have GPS, VHF, UHF, a photographic camera and a compass. Neither 
boat has radar. Both have autonomy of about 8 to 10 hours. There is no night vision equipment. 
DIMAR sometimes assigns the vessels ARC Isla Palma and ARC Gorgona to the area, but their priority 
is weapons and drug smuggling. Over the next few months, the ARC Calima will begin permanent 
enforcement operations at Gorgona PNN.
Organization and Enforcement Planning 
SFF Malpelo: There is a daily plan for terrestrial sectors and a weekly plan for the marine zone 
that take into consideration: personnel organization, random patrols and intelligence activities. The 
maritime authority prepares and is responsible for enforcement operations. Exploration patterns 
are being developed and there are daily logs of enforcement activities. Collaboration with the Navy 
generates trustworthy sources of information, for example, some dive operators collaborate and 
inform the Navy directly (either land-based personnel or the ARC vessel that is in the area) if there 
are any incidents. Fishers inform the Navy when foreign vessels are detected in the sector.
The protection of the MPA is currently not greater than 50% of the total area when the ARC Sula is 
operating normally. However, it breaks down frequently and is not always replaced by another Navy unit. 
Industrial (tuna) and semi-industrial (whitefish) fisheries place constant pressure on Malpelo SFF, both 
directly by illegal fishing and indirectly through fishing at Dorsal Malpelo, the area of influence. Industrial 
and semi-industrial vessels have top speeds of 8 to 15 knots, and autonomies of 7 days to 2 months 
without resupplying. Enforcement is complicated due to the size of the MPA, the high costs of oceanic 
operations, the need for complementary measures, and the lack of modern vessels.
PNN Gorgona: There is little planning for either terrestrial or marine sectors, and planning is based on 
random searches rather than intelligence information. There are no exploration patterns, but there are 
written records. Besides collaboration with the Navy and the Bazán community, there is no access to 
information sources. In general, the enforcement program lacks adequate planning, does not have a 
solid information base, and essentially follows established routines. Patrol boats operate on average 
140 days a year and patrols last from two to three hours translating into 280 patrol hours per year. 
Patrol reports are produced, which have been previously formatted and agreed upon with the other  
authorities. An application is currently being developed to relate thematic terrestrial and marine infor-
mation with mapping. Navy vessels have no routine and are more focused on controlling smuggling 
in the area (narcotics and weapons). In some cases, fishers make complaints after the violations have 
Nearby settlements and multiple uses of the MPA
Gorgona PNN
No settlements in the protected area but they arrive from nearby •	
coastal areas on the continent.
Bazán Island 35 km: at least 15 artisanalfishing boats, •	
maximum 75 hp. 
Guapi 56 km: 2 tour boats.•	
Buenaventura 150 Km.: around three supply vessels which  •	
leave Buenaventura pass through the protected area on a  
weekly basis. Industrial fishing vessels based out of Buenaventura 
are constant visitors to the protected area zone of influence 
and occasionally fish illegally in the protected area itself.
There are no maritime trade routes and there are agreements  •	
with the fishers from Bazán to allow their transit through the area.
Malpelo SSF
No nearby settlements.•	
Buenaventura 490 Km: Colombia’s Pacific industrial port •	
with capacity to manage 20 million tonnes annually. Landing 
port for tuna and whitefish fleets.
There are trade routes close to the Island: Supertankers and •	
smaller ships.
Resolution No. 0761 of 5 August 2002, included as a •	
Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (IMO). Only passage of 
lesser vessels such as sailing boats, mostly en route 
Panama-Galapagos.
occurred and in many cases it is not possible to verify them. The Park has 
developed its relations with stakeholders willing to work collaboratively, such as 
the artisanal fisher group Pescactiva (Bazán Community, El Charco-Nariño). This 
process, initiated in 2000, has led to the realization of projects that contribute to 
the sustainable use of fisheries resources, conflict resolution for aquatic resources 
and the improvement of the standard of living of the fishers. The agreement 
implies a high level of collaboration in issues of research, monitoring, and control 
of aquatic resources in the protected area and its area of influence.
Around Gorgona, fishing vessels mostly have top speeds of 35 knots and 
autonomies of 100 to 150 miles (they often carry extra fuel tanks). As violators 
tend to be artisanal fishers, most vessels are wooden canoes with outboard 
motors and mother vessels with radar that support the fishing activities. The 
main problems arise from abandoned gear in the MPA, which are very harmful to 
the marine environment and generate perpetual conflicts with the communities.
Detection Probability
Malpelo SFF: Malpelo SFF has a surface area of 2,794.25 square nautical miles 
in the marine reserve zone and 3.5 km2 of terrestrial area. Enforcement is oceanic 
and the target vessel type is industrial or semi-industrial. Malpelo SFF is the ninth 
largest fully protected marine protected area in the world.
According to the equation defined at the beginning of this publication, 
detection probability should be estimated with the following site conditions 
and patrol strategy:
Sweep width: 8 to 16 nautical miles (X-width navigation radar for small and large 
vessel detection). 
Distance covered: Variable between 120 and 450 nautical miles.
Area to explore: 2,794.25 nm2 (9,584 km2).
With these parameters, the detection probability is:
Illegal Fishing in Malpelo
In September 2009, while the ARC Sula was out of 
service for maintenance, illegal fishing began again. 
The replacement Navy vessel, ARC José María Palas, 
seized 62 sharks and 118 shark fins. The Director of 
National Parks, Julia Miranda, declared in interviews 
that she had received a number of complaints about 
the presence of Costa Rican and Ecuadorian boats in 
the Malpelo marine area. The Chancellor’s Office has 
sent an official letter of protest to these governments, 
demanding that they control their vessels
Ecuadorian tuna fishers in Malpelo
Four noteworthy cases include the Ecuadorian vessels 
Katty Vetania, Gloria C., María José and Carolina, 
which were intercepted while fishing illegally in 
Malpelo. In the first case, legal proceedings began on 
March 23, 2006 at the Buenaventura Port Authority, 
and sentence was passed on March 28, 2006 with 
a fine of $10,200, which was paid prior to the vessel 
leaving. The second case began on June 28, 2006 
and a fine of $12,300 was imposed on July 1 2006, 
which was also paid before leaving port. The third 
hearing began on September 29, 2006 and a fine of 
$16,320 was imposed, which was paid and appealed. 
Another vessel fined in 2009 is the Carolina – court 
proceedings began on July 18, 2006 and sentence 
was passed on October 13, 2006, and the offenders 
have been notified of the fine amount of $6,150. 
Table 24: Detection Probability in Malpelo SFF.
Malpelo SFF MPA
                 Maximum Effective Detection Distance nm
27.54%  6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
120 22.72% 29.08% 34.91% 40.27% 45.19% 49.70% 53.84% 57.64%
150 27.54% 34.91% 41.54% 47.49% 52.84% 57.64% 61.95% 65.82%
180 32.06% 40.27% 47.49% 53.84% 59.42% 64.32% 68.64% 72.43%
210 36.30% 45.19% 52.84% 59.42% 65.08% 69.95% 74.15% 77.76%
240 40.27% 49.70% 57.64% 64.32% 69.95% 74.70% 78.69% 82.05%
270 44.00% 53.84% 61.95% 68.64% 74.15% 78.69% 82.44% 85.52%
300 47.49% 57.64% 65.82% 72.43% 77.76% 82.05% 85.52% 88.32%
330 50.77% 61.12% 69.30% 75.76% 80.86% 84.89% 88.07% 90.58%
360 53.84% 64.32% 72.43% 78.69% 83.53% 87.27% 90.16% 92.40%
390 56.72% 67.26% 75.23% 81.27% 85.83% 89.28% 91.89% 93.87%
420 59.42% 69.95% 77.76% 83.53% 87.81% 90.97% 93.32% 95.05%
450 61.95% 72.43% 80.02% 85.52% 89.51% 92.40% 94.49% 96.01%Di
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For the analysis, a minimum Detection Probability of 75% was established, which shows that extensive 
permanent presence in the area is required (around 210 hours), to reach acceptable numbers. If this is 
added to the time spent out of service due to maintenance, which in a best-case scenario leads to an 
availability of 80%, the detection probability is reduced to 60%. To compensate for this we recommend 
that an additional vessel with autonomy of at least 20 days and a top speed of 25 knots be obtained. 
Gorgona PNN: Enforcement at Gorgona PNN is less complicated because the area is smaller (598.36 
km2) and there is a greater chance of obtaining backup nearby if required. 
Although the smaller area makes detection easier, the main targets are small wooden or fiberglass 
artisanal vessels no larger than 10 meters. This type of boat has a maximum detection distance of six 
to ten miles, and is mainly detected visually because radar is not efficient for these sizes and materials. 
Additionally, Gorgona PNN does not have oceanic patrol vessels, but only smaller boats. This limitation 
affects the sweep width and keeps it below 10 nm.
With these parameters, the detection probability is:
Sweep width: 6 to 10 nautical miles (X-width navigation radar for small and large vessel detection). 
Distance covered: Variable between 30 and 140 nautical miles.
Area to explore: 174.45 nm2 (598.36 km2).
What the table above shows is that patrolling within Gorgona PNN is very effective even when smaller 
vessels are used. Given that maintenance time must be considered, the ideal situation would require 
two vessels with full crews.
Patrols should not last less than 5 hours, and with a stationary position not greater than 10 hours, there 
is a detection probability close to 100%. To ensure these numbers during night patrols, infrared and 
nocturnal vision equipment are required to obtain a sweep width of 10 nautical miles. This calculation 
shows that at least one small vessel with a crew of at least three Park Wardens is required. Patrol 
vessels should be at least 10 meters long, top speed of 25 knots, 12-hour autonomy (with additional 
fuel tanks), marine VHF radio, GPS, night vision equipment and fixed onboard radar.
Table 25: . Detection Probability in Gorgona PNN.
PNN Gorgona
                 Maximum Effective Detection Distance nm
 
99.43%  6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
30 64.36% 74.74% 82.09% 87.30% 91.00% 93.62% 95.47% 96.79%
40 74.74% 84.03% 89.90% 93.62% 95.96% 97.45% 98.39% 98.98%
50 82.09% 89.90% 94.31% 96.79% 98.19% 98.98% 99.43% 99.68%
60 87.30% 93.62% 96.79% 98.39% 99.19% 99.59% 99.80% 99.90%
70 91.00% 95.96% 98.19% 99.19% 99.64% 99.84% 99.93% 99.97%
80 93.62% 97.45% 98.98% 99.59% 99.84% 99.93% 99.97% 99.99%
90 95.47% 98.39% 99.43% 99.80% 99.93% 99.97% 99.99% 100.00%
100 96.79% 98.98% 99.68% 99.90% 99.97% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00%
110 97.73% 99.36% 99.82% 99.95% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
120 98.39% 99.59% 99.90% 99.97% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
130 98.86% 99.74% 99.94% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%
140 99.19% 99.84% 99.97% 99.99% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00% 100.00%Di
st
an
ce
 C
ov
er
ed
 (n
m
) o
r H
ou
rs
 P
at
ro
lle
d 
nm
/1
20
Electronic Monitoring Systems for Vessels
In Colombia, DIMER has implemented a satellite monitoring system (VMS) and fishing vessels are 
monitored directly from Bogota. However, the resulting information is only used to protect life at 
sea, i.e. exclusively for safety issues. VMS are multi-purpose devices that generate information 
about vessel location and routes. Agreements need to be drawn up in Colombia to permit the use 
of this information by different maritime authorities and MPAs. Monitoring systems should also be 
implemented on other vessel types (tourism, transport) which use MPA waters and are currently 
not controlled in any way. There are no other means of electronic surveillance such as radar or AIS 
(Automatic Identification Systems).
Interception and Arrest
Malpelo: There is a Protocol for boarding vessels and crime scene investigation. There is a 
continuous training program that involves the Navy, DIMAR, the Attorney General, INCODER and 
National Natural Parks. There is a template for the collection of basic information on the offender, 
samples of the plant, animal and aquatic resource material and other species, along with products, 
elements, equipment, vehicles and methods used to commit the environmental offence. 
There are procedures for the collection of evidence, but these are not always followed properly. 
For example, the condition of the nets on the vessel is often not reported, so it is difficult to 
determine whether the catch came from the MPA or a nearby area. In general, basic information 
is collected, but evidence is not collected in the correct manner, which limits both the penal and 
the civil legal processes. The Navy and National Natural Parks personnel responsible for collecting 
evidence are being trained but personnel rotation or the replacement of the ARC Sula are factors 
which affect investigations and the resulting legal processes. Reports are handed in on time, 
some are even done while still at sea. There is a 36 hour period for Habeas Corpus, which implies 
a need to develop an effective procedure in terms of information and the capacity to involve other 
administrative authorities such as the Attorney General, because if the reports are not properly 
prepared, charges may be dropped.
There is a manual for environmental sanctions (Law 1333 of 2009), and the Environmental Authority, 
in this case National Natural Parks, reports basic statistics. In penal cases, these are transferred to 
the Attorney General and in administrative cases, INCODER is the corresponding authority. 
Gorgona: There are no boarding procedures in Gorgona PNN. For this type of investigation, Law 
1333 (2009) applies, which sets out the environmental sanctioning procedure and dictates other 
dispositions. In general, when the offender is caught red-handed, an official report is prepared which 
states the motives for the arrest, the authority making the arrest, the place, date and time, person 
responsible, and person, project, work or activity to which the preventative measure was applied. 
The document is signed by the offender or, in case of refusal, a witness, or if there are no witnesses, 
the officer in charge. The document is made official by an administrative act, where the conditions of 
the preventative measures are established over a three-day period. 
There is a template for the collection of basic information on the offender, samples of the plant, 
animal and aquatic resource material and other species, along with products, elements, equipment, 
vehicles and methods used to commit the environmental offence. In general this is not applied to 
artisanal fishing or fishing gear abandonment that occurs in Gorgona. If necessary, it is possible to 
order the examination of evidence in accordance with the principles of propriety, pertinence and 
necessity. In Gorgona PNN reports are required to be produced immediately because the offences, 
being artisanal fishing or gear abandonment, are committed in flagrante.
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Prosecutions, Sanctions and Sentencing 
There is a manual for environmental sanctions (Law 1333 of 2009), and basic statistics are 
reported by the Environmental Authority, in this case National Natural Parks and Fauna and 
Flora Sanctuaries. Environmental offences are remitted to the Directors who act as a first legal 
instance and try to resolve the cases as quickly as possible.
The crew and vessels which may have committed an offence or crime, along with the catch found 
on board and the fishing or dive gear are confiscated and placed under the case of the responsible 
authorities in the time frame stipulated by the law, once the vessel arrives in port.
In general there are three types of violations in MPAs, two of which are administrative offences:
To fish illegally in a PNN and SFF MPA system is an environmental violation and an 1. 
administrative offence. In this case the sanction is the confiscation of the catch and 
gear (vessels and nets or lines) or fines of up to 5,000 minimum salaries (US$750,000). 
Equipment and catch are mostly handed over to INCODER, and the proceeds from 
fines cover the legal payment system, which is complex, costly and of little benefit to 
environmental restoration.
A second administrative violation in the form of illegal fishing in a closed area is dealt 2. 
with by INCODER and implies sanctions such as the permanent confiscation of the 
products and equipment (vessels and fishing gear), cancellation of fishing permits and 
monetary fines. The sanction imposed is the confiscation of the gear and products, 
which are auctioned by INCODER who incorporates the proceeds into its budget.
A third penal offence is presented to the Office of the Attorney and may imply sanctions 3. 
similar to the above, but may also results in detention. These are generally not prison 
offences, but if the offender is recurring, the maximum penalty may be applied (up to three 
years prison sentence).
Material Authority
Ship or fishing vessel Buenaventura Port Authority
Fishing INCODER
Weapons District Attorney
Fishing and dive gear INCODER
National Crew District Attorney
International crew District Attorney – DAS
Minors/Underage District Attorney – Family Welfare
Narcotics, flammables District Attorney 
Table 26: Disposal of confiscated materials
Table 27: Evaluation of Administrative or Penal Processes
Process
Factor under 
Observation
Speed and efficiency of Administrative Processes.
Criteria Verify length of time from start to completion of 
administrative processes. Estimate average time  
(take around five cases).
Gorgona Gear abandonment: 1 month, does not involve any 
people.
Artisanal fishing: 4 to 5 months, involves one or more 
people. In general the processes are fast because 
once the preventative confiscation has occurred, 
there is no contact with the offender or there is no 
offender because the gear has been abandoned.
Malpelo One year, the offender often has a defense lawyer who 
uses technicalities to appeal and plea for reversal.
Factor under 
Observation
Speed and efficiency of Judicial Processes.
Criteria Verify time from start to finish of administrative 
processes. Calculate average time (at least 5 cases).
Gorgona There have been no judicial processes.
Malpelo 1) Formulation and charges (District Attorney): immediate.
2) Trial (Judicial Authority): relative 3 months to 2 years, 
depending on evidence solicited and appeals. 
Factor under 
Observation
Proportion of unresolved cases.
Criteria Proportion of all the cases over the last five years which 
have not been resolved.
Gorgona 100% of cases have been resolved. Statistics refer 
to recent years, especially cases in 2009.
Malpelo 100% of cases have been resolved.
Factor under 
Observation
Proportion of cases presented which are accepted.
Criteria Ideally 100%.
Gorgona All administrative cases have been accepted.
Malpelo 100% of cases presented have been admitted because 
the offenders were all caught in the act (industrial fishing 
and abandonment of fishing gear), which are clear 
environmental offences.
Factor under 
Observation
Case follow up.
Criteria Is there a mechanism that permits the environmental 
authority or the MPA to participate in judicial cases?
Gorgona There have been no judicial processes, but the 
environmental authority becomes the affected party 
in the judicial process.
Malpelo By Law, the environmental authority becomes the 
affected party in the judicial process.
Sanctions and Sentencing
Factor under 
Observation
Proportion of processes initiated versus sentences.
Criteria If proportion is low, determine the reasons why: 
inadequate procedures? Bad management of evidence? 
Abandonment of case? Prescription? Pressure on 
justice system?
Gorgona High efficiency (82%).
Malpelo Efficiency is very low due to the distances between the 
protected area and the closest port. Initially it was not 
possible to comply with the 36-hour limit required by law 
to present the official report. There are problems with 
evidence collection, and the detained are usually industrial 
fishers who place appeals. 
Factor under 
Observation
Processing time.
Criteria Take at least 5 cases and average their length.
Gorgona Average of 4 months from start of investigation to 
sentencing.
Malpelo From 18 to 24 months for cases in 2008 and 2009.
Factor under 
Observation
Sentences carried out.
Criteria Verify whether sentences were carried out (proportion).
Gorgona Of the 14 cases resolves, only three had effective 
sanctions – confiscation of fishing gear. The rest of the 
cases were shelved.
Malpelo In both cases the sanction went to debt collection to 
make it effective.
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Recommendations
Malpelo Fauna and Flora Sanctuary and  
Gorgona National Natural Park, Colombia
Surveillance and Detection 
Critical Aspect Lack of vessels in both MPAs: oceanic boat in Malpelo 
and two boats for Gorgona.
Recommendation 1) Add an oceanic vessel with 20 days autonomy and 
top speed of 25 knots to Malpelo patrol team. Include 
radar, GPS, night vision equipment, HF radio and marine 
VHF radio.
2) Add a fiberglass boat, 10 m length, 25 knots top 
speed and 12 hour autonomy to Gorgona.
Feasibility Medium. Should be arranged with Colombian 
government and potential donors.
Estimated Cost 1) US$850,000. 
2) US$100,000.
Critical Aspect Constant rotation of Navy personnel.
Recommendation Implement a permanent training program for  
environmental issues and legal processes for violators.
Feasibility Viable but requires advocacy.
Estimated Cost $25,000 per year.
Critical Aspect Park Warden salaries are not competitive.
Recommendation 1) Increase budget for Park Wardens. 
2) Consider per diem payments (for work at sea or in 
remote locations).
Feasibility 1) There is will but no funds. 
2) Per diem budget could be increased.
Estimated Cost 1) Cost assumed by the Colombian Government. 
2) US$50,000 per year. Cost assumed by Colombian 
Government or by NGOs for a period of time.
Critical Aspect Personnel limitations.
Recommendation 1) Assign qualified personnel to Gorgona PNN and 
Malpelo SFF on a permanent basis. Two professionals 
and three Park Wardens in Gorgona.  
2) Departments of Public Works (Treasury Department) 
must increase the number of professional and  
technical job positions in National Natural Parks staff.
Feasibility 1) Medium. Requires lobbying and pressure. 
2) Political will in the face of a clear and justified need. 
Direct budget assignment.
Estimated Cost US$60,000 per year. Can be assumed by Colombian 
Government.
Surveillance and Detection (cont.) 
Critical Aspect Low availability of vessels due to poor maintenance.
Recommendation Establish a Technical Assistance or Support Agreement 
with NGOs to obtain funds to hire a permanent  
mechanic, tools and replacement parts for existing fleet.
Feasibility There is political will. Cost-benefit ratio of this action 
is optimal.
Estimated Cost USD $80,000 per year.
Critical Aspect Environmental Authority does not participate in 
electronic vessel monitoring.
Recommendation Agree access to electronic monitoring data with 
Maritime Authority.
Feasibility Low. This agreement should be pursued but there are 
conflicts of jurisdiction between institutions and interests 
from sectors that do not wish to be controlled.
Estimated Cost US$225,000 in equipment and training to create a 
parallel Monitoring Center in case the Maritime Authority 
does not approve shared use of its resources.
Critical Aspect Enforcement of the protected area is under the 
jurisdiction of the Navy. There is collaboration with state 
authorities but the Navy sets priorities for operations and 
these rarely benefit MPA management.
Recommendation 1) Improve planning of operations, especially in Gorgona. 
2) Add new vessels to both MPAs.
3) Carry out annual planning workshops with top 
ranking authorities.
Feasibility Political will to link technical personnel specialized 
in environmental issues to strengthen enforcement 
groups in marine and coastal areas.
Estimated Cost 1) None. 
2) Included above. 
3) $25,000 per year.
Critical Aspect Sanctions do not reflect the damage caused to the 
resource and costs of reparation.
Recommendation Modify regulations to allow the Environmental Authority 
to seize illegal catches, and include the cost of resource 
recovery in the sanctions imposed.
Feasibility Low. The current regulatory framework must be 
modified; this will affect several interest groups.
Estimated Cost US$30,000.
Critical Aspect Impunity: Slow processes and loss of cases.
Recommendation 1) Develop a legal assistance program that permits 
prosecution of cases as support to the administrative 
authority or as public or private plaintiff. 
2) Promote administrative sanctions that can be 
imposed by the MPA Director.
Feasibility Medium. The Environmental Authority is interested, 
implementation would be simple, and the results 
immediate. However, the action would generate a 
response from the affected parties and a political 
reaction can be expected.
Estimated Cost 1) US $30,000 per year for a lawyer. 
2) US$15,000.
Interception and Arrest
Critical Aspect Lack of training of Park Wardens.
Recommendation Fully integrated Park Warden training, following 
international course guidelines and recommendations 
and the exercise of their activities at sea. Special 
attention should be given to boarding protocols and 
crime scene investigation.
Feasibility High. The Environmental Authority must be involved to 
establish this on a permanent basis.
Estimated Cost US$45,000. Costs depend on courses, visits, seminars 
according to market price or arrangements made by 
NGOs or Colombian Government.
Critical Aspect No census of vessels which use the MPA.
Recommendation Carry out census of vessels to regulate their entry to 
Gorgona.
Feasibility High.
Estimated Cost US$20,000.
Critical Aspect Officials, Park Wardens and Attorneys do not fully 
understand the regulatory framework.
Recommendation Carry out workshops and forums that keep the different 
authorities in the marine and coastal area up to date 
with the regulatory framework and with the protocols 
and templates required for administrative and judicial 
processes. The judges and attorneys who are involved 
in these cases should also participate, because in 
some cases their lack of knowledge has led them to 
ignore the impact created by the offenders.
Feasibility Medium.
Estimated Cost $45,000 per year.
Critical Aspect Lack of capacity to monitor cases taken up by 
INCODER and District Attorney.
Recommendation 1) Assign lawyers to assist monitoring penal and fishing 
cases, and enlist the support of educational institutions 
(universities). 
2) Explore possibility for NGOs to monitor cases or act 
as plaintiffs.
Feasibility High, especially in cooperation agreements with Universi-
ties with law Schools (internships).
Estimated Cost US$60,000 per year.
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Background
The Galapagos Marine Reserve (GMR) is one of the largest marine reserves in the world. It covers 
an area of ocean of more than 133,000 km2, around the islands, which make up the Galapagos 
Archipelago. The GMR extends 40 nautical miles from a baseline, which joins the furthest points 
around the major islands. The GMR was formally created in March 1998 by the proclamation of 
the Special Law for the Sustainable Development and Conservation of the Province of Galapagos 
(LOREG). Twelve years later it is clear that important advances have been made in terms of fleet size, 
infrastructure, human resources and institutional development. However, the management of marine 
resources is still a complicated matter, especially due to the constant pressure placed on resources 
and the need for technical and human coordination in the maintenance of the patrol fleet. 
Socioeconomic Value 
The Artisanal Fishing Sector
Initially, economic activities in Galapagos were based mainly on fishing. This situation remained 
unchanged from the beginning of the 20th century until the start of the 1970s. The main target 
species in Galapagos are the lobster, sea cucumber, tuna, and several species of whitefish 
(Galapagos grouper “bacalao”, wahoo, snapper, dolphinfish etc). These are all species of high 
unit value (lobster US$10 per pound, dried sea cucumber US$5 per pound). There is no formal 
sustained market chain. The Galapagos fishing fleet is mainly artisanal and made up of fiberglass 
vessels (less than 7.5 m length), and boats (larger vessels up to 20-25 Tonnes). Fishing activity 
peaked at the end of the 1990s with the sea cucumber boom, but the progressive decline of the 
resource has reduced the fleet. Currently, there are 446 fishing vessels registered in the GMR but 
they continue to be retired from fishing due to their condition, resource depletion or because the 
owner changes activity. At present only 335 vessels are active, of which 48 are categorized as 
“botes” that is, vessels with a greater capacity.
At its peak, fishing generated between 1,000 and 2,000 jobs, but monitoring records over the last 
three years show a significant reduction in this number (currently about 365 to 400 active fishers). This 
is due mainly to changes in economic activity as people opt for other opportunities, especially tourism, 
either as employees or as small private businesses linked to tourism, but also to the increasing costs 
of operation and the depletion of fishery resources. The evolution of the fishing sector has been 
irregular but marked by a declining trend in income.
Galapagos Islands 
Ecuador
Active Artisanal Fishing Vessels
Type of Vessel San Cristóbal Santa Cruz Isabela TOTAL
Boats 27 16 5 48
Fiberglass 71 63 78 212
Pangas 65 11 19 95
TOTAL 163 90 102 355
Table 28: Registered Fishing vessels in the GMR 
Source: GNP records
This sector has been greatly influenced by mafias and members of illegal smuggling rings, because 
the GMR has easily harvestable high value marine resources. A set of dried shark fins can fetch 
between US$60 and US$100 (this is from one individual shark, and depending on the size of its 
fins), and sharks are abundant in the GMR. Quick, lucrative money can be made if a local fisher 
can catch, on average, between three and five sharks over a two-day period. This translates into a 
negative situation for conservation and management.
The Industrial and Semi-industrial Fishing Sector
The GMR is located in a highly valuable geographic sector from the point of view of industrial fishing, 
due to the abundance of migratory resources such as tuna and whitefish. Ecuador possesses the 
largest tuna fleet in the South Pacific, and there are also important fleets in Colombia, Panama and 
Mexico, while international Asian fleets are based out of private ports in Costa Rica. Most tuna boat 
owners are multinationals and are members of the ITATTC. This tuna fleet is highly specialized and 
its vessels have a high level of autonomy, therefore the Galapagos Special Law prohibits its entry into 
the marine reserve, along with other mechanized fishing vessels with high efficiency and technology. 
Another group of vessels, which threatens the GMR, are the semi-industrial fishing vessels (20 
to 50 gross tons). These vessels come from Costa Rica, Colombia and Ecuador and operate in 
conjunction with various fiberglass boats (pangas), which they either tow or meet up with from 
local ports in the GMR. These small boats are very difficult to detect from GNP or coastguard 
patrol vessels and enter into the marine reserve to fish. Given the size of the GMR, there are often 
requests for “innocent passage” by tuna vessels en route elsewhere, but these innocent passages 
are being used to set fish aggregating devices (FADs) which makes fishing more efficient.
The Tourism Sector
The first organized tourism activities began from 1966 to 1972, and then grew and became 
internationally renowned from 1980-85, registering annual growth rates of 8% to 15%, so that the 
total estimated number of tourists arriving in Galapagos in 2009 was 180,000. Current projection 
rates suggest that in four years Galapagos will be reaching 300,000 tourists each year unless 
steps are taken to reduce this growth rate. 
Year Registered 
Fishers
Active  
Fishers
1999 752 682
2000 682 1,183
2001 834 879
2002 1,059 677
2003 978 645
2004 997 703
2005 1,001 659
2006 1,007 450
2006 1,023 400
Table 29: Fishers in the Galapagos Marine Reserve over time 
Source: Galapagos National Park Administration
Registered and Active Lobster Fishers  
in the Galapagos Marine Reserve
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Direct income from cruise based tourism from 1991 to 2006 (that is, the tour fleet and travel 
agencies) grew at an impressive rate of 725% from an initial value of US$19.7 million (Epler ,1993) 
to US$145.5 million (Epler , 2007). Travel agencies accounted for US$25 million, of which US$20 
million went to international agencies and US$5 million to local agencies or counterparts. Cruise 
tourism, according to the same study, reflected an average annual growth rate of 14% for the 
period 1991–2006, from which the report concludes that:
Tourism drives the local economy.• 
The relationship between income and population size shows a clear effect on the local • 
economy (shown by the high cost of living and inflation).
The tourism industry is a magnet for labor and businesses for the local population, and in • 
effect, is the cause of the reduction of the fishing fleet and of migration to the islands.
The Galapagos tourism fleet (in 2009) consists of 84 vessels, all of which are active and licensed to 
carry out their activities within the GMR.
The Galapagos National Park (GNP) is about to distribute more than 70 new tour operator licenses 
for a similar number of vessels for different modes of operation. This decision will accelerate the 
growth of the number of tourists visiting the islands, so we are certain that if the current control 
schemes are maintained, the problems will be exacerbated. In addition, local based tourism grew 
from US$1.2 million in 1991 (Epler, 1993) to approximately US$10.7 million in 2006 (Epler, 
2007); an average annual growth rate of 14%. Santa Cruz accounted for 91.6% of this income, 
and accounts for 83% of the activity.
Figure 8: Tourist visits to the GNP. Trends. 
Source: GNP records
Number of Tourists
Tour Vessels Registered with GNP 
State Tonnage
Inactive Active < 20 TRB > 20 TRB
0 84 1 83
0 84 1 83
Table 30: Tour vessels operating in Galapagos, 2009
Hotels $1.1 $10.73
Cruise boats $19.6 $120.50
On-island expenses NA $12.04
TOTAL $20.7 $143.27
Table 31 : Amount and distribution of expenses incurred by tourists in Galapagos, 1991 vs 2006
Other Activities in the GMR
The growth of tourism has led to a surge of new activities and an increase in existing marine activities 
such as the transport of tourists between ports (13 vessels), cargo transport (seven vessels), fuel 
transport (two vessels) and site tourism vessels (daily tours to visitor sites but which are categorized 
as “transport”). These activities are either unregulated or insufficiently regulated, resulting in risks to the 
management of the GMR. 
Analysis of Context/Governance 
Marine environmental legislation in Ecuador is dispersed and lacks specificity. There is no single national 
legal body that establishes universal activity and marine management regulations and sanctions. 
The Galapagos Special Law (LOREG) is the most complete set of regulations as it defines violations 
and crimes, and establishes sanctions specifically for fishing and tourism activities, but it is limited to 
the GMR. Unfortunately, it later became evident that other activities such as passenger transport, cargo 
transport, fuel transport and submarine activities were never regulated, so the Law became outdated 
soon after its implementation. Another incomplete aspect of the LOREG was that it provided exclusive 
mechanisms and privileges to the local population with regard to access to natural resources, but did 
not establish the obligations and definitions in the case of local citizens not abiding by the law, especially 
in recurring cases. Having said this, an important aspect of the LOREG is the authority granted the 
Director of the Galapagos National Park as a first instance judge. This implied a fundamental progress 
in the matter of sanctions and permitted most violations to be addressed on a local level, within the  
administrative regime, leaving criminal offences to the courts. Given the importance of the marine 
reserve, the GNP has the same authority as a Subsecretary under the Minister of Environment; both 
can facilitate the preparation of proposals for Regulations, or changes to these (which need to be 
approved by the Presidency of the Republic), as well as the proclamation of Resolutions of immediate 
application within its area of jurisdiction as an operational complement to the legal framework.
Education and Dissemination
The GNP has an extensive permanent Education and Dissemination program and has also created 
alliances with public and private institutions for the correct execution of these tasks. The GNP 
relies on the permanent support of the following partners: Charles Darwin Foundation, Provincial 
Board of Education, Conservation International (NGO) and FUNDAR (NGO). Despite these efforts, 
the academic level of the formal education system in the Galapagos Province is one of the lowest 
in the country. This is ironic if one considers that, without doubt, it is the province with the highest 
per capita income and employment rates. 
Inter-Institutional Relations and Conflicts between Guilds and Institutions 
The creation of the GMR is a relatively recent event (1998). Once the LOREG went into effect, there 
were an infinite number of conflicts between national and local institutions, which were correcting 
and defining the assignment of responsibilities, jurisdiction and funds generated from the visitor 
entry fee. Additionally, the sustained growth of tourism resulted in an unexpected and permanent 
increase in funds. This, in turn, politicized the Park Director position due to disputes regarding the 
allocation and control of all this new income. As in all scenarios, the main inter-institutional conflicts 
arose from overlapping powers (Navy-GNP, Municipalities-GNP, Prefecture-Municipalities, etc) and 
levels of access to decision-making powers, access to economic resources and political interests.
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Administrative Decentralization
Although the LOREG decentralized the GNP, recent changes in the structure and administration 
of the State have centralized control once more. This centralization has given the State control of 
funds, but at the expense of making the GNP more bureaucratic. There is also the possibility that 
the State might use those funds for other ends. 
Stakeholders
Public Stakeholders
Name of Institution 
(Public Entity)
Role in MPA Role of Civil Servant
Ministry of Environment Maximum political and environmental regulatory 
authority.
Minister.
Galapagos National 
Park Service
MPA Administrator. Director.
National Administration 
of Aquatic Spaces
Maritime Authority. Safety of life at sea, vessel 
and crew registration, marine traffic control.
Director
Insular Administration  
of the Merchant Marine
Same as above but with delegated authority 
locally for Galapagos.
Director
Coastguard Maritime police. Marine surveillance and control. Commander
Ministry of Tourism Maximum political and national regulatory 
authority for tourism activities.
Minister
Galapagos National 
Institute (INGALA)
Maximum authority for planning and migratory 
control in the province.
Director
Port Authorities Local delegate of the Maritime Authority. 
Authorizes port entry and exit and qualifications 
of marine personnel. 
Port Captain
Ministry of Agriculture, 
SESA-SICGAL
Control of species introduction and eradication. Director
Environmental Police Prevention, Control and application of the Law 
with regard to environmental offences in urban 
areas, ports and airports.
Commander UPMA
Municipality of San 
Cristobal
Administration of the district urban zone. Political Stakeholder. Joint management for ac-
cess to economic resources. MPA is not a priority.
Municipality of Santa 
Cruz
Administration of the district urban zone. Political Stakeholder. Joint management for ac-
cess to economic resources. MPA is not a priority.
Municipality of Isabela Administration of the district urban zone. Political Stakeholder. Joint management for ac-
cess to economic resources. MPA is not a priority.
Provincial Prefecture Manages public works in the Province. Will be 
eliminated in the short term.
Provincial Political Stakeholder. Overlapping 
management with Municipalities but joint 
actions to access economic resources .
Provincial Board  
of Education
Responsible for the provincial education policy. Education. Very weak institution. Academic level 
of graduating students does not show progress.
Provincial Board  
of Agriculture
Public Stakeholder. Responsible for the 
provincial agriculture policy.
Agriculture. Weak functional and economic 
situation.
Provincial Board  
of Tourism
Public Actor. Responsible for the provincial 
health policy.
Tourism. Weak functional and economic 
situation.
Provincial Board  
of Health
Public Actor. Responsible for the provincial 
health policy.
Public health. Weak functional and economic 
situation.
Table 32: Public Sector Actors
Private Sector Stakeholders and Non-Government Organizations
Surveillance and Detection 
Personnel
The current GNP fleet requires a crew of 79 people. With the application of advanced surveillance 
technology (VMS-AIS) this could be reduced by 10-15 people. In the following analysis we will use 
current figures for the entire fleet. The Government has only authorized 38 of these positions, so 
there is a deficit of 41 crew members, as shown in the following table: 
Table 33: Private Sector Actors
Stakeholder  Type of stakeholder: 
Public, Private,  
Community, NGO, other
Type of attitude or commitment to the  
management of the MPA
ASOGAL. Association 
of Galapagos Tour 
Operators.
Private Group of large and international tour operators. Usually have 
political power and lobbying capacity. Situational support of 
the GMR.
CAPTURGAL. 
Galapagos Provincial 
Chamber of Tourism
Private Local tour operator guild. Less economic capacity. Commit-
ted to the GMR but challenge regulations because they find it 
complicated to comply with environmental standards.
Charles Darwin 
Research Station
NGO Supports the GMR in terms of scientific research, education, 
management, dissemination, participatory management etc.
World Wildlife Fund NGO Supports GMR enforcement, fisheries management, waste 
recycling, species introduction etc.
Conservation  
International
NGO Supports GMR enforcement, scientific research, eradication and 
control of species. 
Spanish International 
Cooperation Agency
NGO Supports GMR in issues of governance, institutional strengthing 
and socio-economic projects.
Sea Shepherd NGO Supports GMR enforcement.
WildAid NGO Supports GMR enforcement and trafficking of protected species.
FUNDAR NGO Supports GMR in socio-economic and governance issues.
University of Guayaquil Private, University Supports GMR management and marine research.
University of San 
Francisco - GAIAS
Private, University Supports GMR management and marine research.
Personnel Required 
(minimum)
Backup 
personnel
Total Authorized Deficit
Captains 5 2 7 7 0
Helmsman 19 5 24 7 17
Seamen 24 9 33 22 11
Engineer 3 1 4 2 2
Assistant Engineer 7 4 11 0 11
TOTAL 58 21 79 38 41
Table 34: Crew requirements for GNP vessels
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In operations control and administration tasks of the unit, there is a deficit of four persons, of which at 
least two should be urgently incorporated for Operations Control activities:
In Maintenance and Repairs, the GNP has a deficit of seven persons, as outlined below (observe the 
technical skills which are required):
Size and Complexity of the Marine Area
The area of interest is vast (>133,000 Km2) and the support posts are located mainly in the southeast, 
making the opposite area (north and northeast) complicated to patrol.
Administrative Personnel Required 
(minimum)
Backup 
personnel
Total Authorized Deficit
Marine Control 1 0 1 1 0
Head of Operations Control 1 0 1 0 1
Park Wardens – operations control 3 1 4 2 2
Radio operators 1 0 1 0 1
Marine Biologist 1 0 1 1 0
Fisheries Manager 1 0 1 1 0
Park Wardens 2 0 2 2 0
Fisheries inspector 3 0 3 3 0
Monitoring specialist 1 0 1 1 0
Conservation Official 1 0 1 1 0
Secretary 1 0 1 1 0
TOTAL 16 1 17 13 4
Table 35: Required GNP Administrative Positions for the GMR 
Technical Personnel Required 
(minimum)
Backup 
personnel
Total Authorized Deficit
Head of Maintenance 1 0 1 1 0
Electrician 1 0 1 0 1
Outboard motor engineer 1 0 1 1 0
Diesel motor engineer 1 0 1 0 1
Assistant mechanics 2 0 2 0 2
Logistics coordinator 1 0 1 1 0
Cooling systems technician 1 0 1 0 1
Welder 1 0 1 0 1
Secretary-Archivist 1 0 1 0 1
TOTAL 10 0 10 0 7
Table 36: Required Administrative and Technical Personnel for the GMR
Enforcement Vessels
The three offices (Cristóbal, Santa Cruz, Isabela), currently have 15 vessels. Vessel type, name and 
category are listed below:
Vessel maintenance and upkeep is a key issue; when this is not conducted properly it gives the 
false impression that more vessels and a higher operational budget are required. In reality, what is 
required is an efficient maintenance system. The unnecessary growth of the fleet without a proper 
support system should be avoided as this would only worsen the situation. 
The increase of investments in patrolling resources for the GMR which occurred between 2001 and 
2005, generated additional pressure on expenses (Annual Operational Budget – AOB); this relates 
to salaries, fuel, lubricant, per diems, travel support, insurance, tools, expendable materials. This 
reached a point in 2006 and 2007, when the AOB exceeded US$2,300,000 (including costs of 
Operation and Maintenance). This placed enormous pressure on maintenance and repair systems, 
which overwhelmed the logistical and technical capacity of the GNP along with the administrative 
processes linked to the unit. Despite this, there was even talk of purchasing more vessels. 
The growth of the fleet was not a result of technical planning, but rather the result of donations 
and financing opportunities that were snapped up rapidly. Unfortunately, initial investment in boats 
can generate huge ongoing costs.
Under this scheme, the cost-efficiency indices of enforcement reflected a progressive deterioration 
so that by May 2006, all GNP vessels were non-operational. With the support of several NGOs, the 
GNP was able to start a comprehensive maintenance program, technical support and key spare 
part purchases in the second half of that year.
These actions later resulted in a significant increase in operations and vessel availability for 2007, 
2008 and 2009. The improvement project started with an efficiency indicator (measured in patrol 
hours) obtained from various sources (Port Captain and GNP records) in order to track changes.
Type Name Type/category Length (meters) Top speed & 
Autonomy
Gross Tonneage Administration 
Office
Marine Guadalupe River Oceanic 30.50 m 21 Kt, 5d 120.41 TM Santa Cruz
Sierra Negra Oceanic 33.37 m 11 Kt, 15d 209.6 TM Santa Cruz
Yoshka Oceanic 28.80 m 22 Kt, 4 d 105.63 TM Santa Cruz
Sea Mar Semi- Oceanic 11.80 m 20 Kt, 4 d 17.07 TM Santa Cruz
Araucaria Semi- Oceanic 10.01 m 16 Kt, 3d 19.13 TM San Cristóbal
Tiburón Martillo Floating Base 15.5 m 0 Kt, 30 d 30.50 TM Santa Cruz
Sea Ranger 1 Speed boat 7.5 m. 15K, 6hs <20 TM Santa Cruz
Sea Ranger 2 Speed boat 11.0 m 25K, 6hs <20 TM Santa Cruz
Sea Ranger 3 Speed boat 11.0 m 25K, 6hs <20 TM Santa Cruz
Sea Ranger 8 Speed boat 7.5 m 25K, 6hs <20 TM San Cristóbal
Sea Ranger 9 Speed boat 11.0 m 25K, 6hs <20 TM Santa Cruz
Sea Ranger 10 Speed boat 10.5 m. 25K, 6hs <20 TM Cristóbal
Sea Ranger 11 Speed boat 11.0 m 25K, 6hs <20 TM Isabela
Terrestrial Bolívar Base Hut n.a. n.a. n.a. Santa Cruz
Aerial Sea Wolf Airplane n.a. 6 hs n.a. Santa Cruz
Table 37: GNP Enforcement and Logistical Support Vessels 
Source: GNP Records
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By the end of 2006, the mean monthly operation time per vessel was: 
The GNP reviewed the vessel requirements as a function of violation statistics by geographical 
sector. Surveillance subsectors were created in accordance with Table No.40 to focalize patrolling 
effort. In consequence, vessels were reassigned to different geographical areas depending on the 
operation type:
Vessel Type Mean Monthly Registered 
Hours
Hours of Operation Under 
Normal Conditions
Oceanic Vessels 45.5 hours/month 360 hours/month
Sea Rangers (fiberglass boats) 27.7 hours/month 168 a 240 hours/month
Table 38: Operational condition of GNP vessels. Second semester 2006 
Source: GNP Records. GNP Zonation for control and surveillance 
Edited by: WildAid. Oswaldo Rosero and Marcel Bigué
Marine Area Vessel Requirements Area (Nm2) Quantity
North Sector  
(Darwin and Wolf) – SECTOR 1
Floating base 
Semi-oceanic vessel  
Fiberglass speedboat (Sea Ranger)
Darwin and Wolf 1 
1 
1
Isabela  
(South and West, P. Villamil and Canal 
Bolívar) SECTORS 3 and 4
Oceanic Vessel 
Fiberglass speedboat (Sea Ranger) 
based on land (Canal Bolívar) 
Fibra (Sea Ranger) based at Pto. Villamil
S3: 3,509.38 
 
S4: 5,146.61
1 
1 
1 
1
Interior Waters  
(Isabela-S. Cruz-S. Cristóbal), SECTOR 7
Fiberglass speedboat (Sea Ranger) 4,404.74 2
North-east Sector  
(Genovesa S. Cristóbal), SECTOR 6
Oceanic Vessel S6: 18,914.41 1
South-coastal Sector 
SECTOR 6 and 5
Fiberglass speedboat (Sea Ranger) S5: 3,417.46 1
South Sector 
SECTOR 2
Semi-oceanic vessel 5,068.13 1 
Logístics Oceanic Vessel 
Fiberglass speedboat (Sea Ranger)
0 1 
1
Entire GMR Airplane 0 1
TOTAL 15
Table 39: Number of vessels required for GNP surveillance by geographical sector
Figure 9: GMR Control and Surveillance Sectors
Vessel Availability and Annual Days of Operation
The improvement in maintenance and spare parts provision systems applied from 2006 onwards, 
generated a considerable increase in the number of operations in 2007 and 2008, as can be 
observed in the figure below:
The international NGOs will maintain their technical support for three or more years. However, the 
GNP has not been able to strengthen the areas of logistics and technical support, so the weakness 
persists and a process should be proposed which tackles the various critical points which have 
been identified as follows:
Lack of a head engineer in charge of maintenance.• 
Outdated preventative onboard maintenance plans.• 
Excessive spare parts purchase time or frequent mistakes  • 
which result in restarting the entire process.
Lack of trained Park Wardens.• 
Lack of a training program.• 
Surveillance Technology
Onboard Equipment
The floating base in the north (Darwin and Wolf) and the Bolivar Base both have satellite telephones. 
Other satellite telephones are carried depending on the situation but are not part of the permanent 
equipment. We consider that all vessels are well equipped. 
Oceanic and Semi-Oceanic Vessels Fiberglass Speedboats (Sea Rangers)
S-bandwidth radar (long distance surveillance). Only oceanic vessels. X-bandwidth radar (precision close range surveillance)
X-bandwudth radar (precision close range surveillance) GPS with incorporated digital map. Fixed and handheld.
GPS with incorporated digital map. Fixed and handheld. Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA)
Automatic Radar Plotting Aid (ARPA) Radios VHF con tecnología DSC
Automatic Identification System – AIS Binoculars
Vessel Monitoring System – VMS (satellite) Night vision equipment
HF and VHF radio with DSC technology Video camera
Video camera/photographic camera/night vision equipment/binoculars Photographic camera
Table 40: GNP vessel equipment
Figure 10: Annual number of surveillance and control operations, GMR 
Source: Galapagos National Park Service
Vessels Detained
Vessels Inspected
Violations Detected
Operations
56
57
WildAid
C
os
ta
 R
ic
a
P
re
fa
ce
C
on
cl
us
io
n
P
an
am
a
C
ol
om
b
ia
E
cu
ad
or
Long Distance Monitoring System
Between 2006 and 2007, the Maritime Authority and the Galapagos National Park (Resolution 
DIGMER 054/2007) planned to implement a satellite Vessel Monitoring System (VMS). The Maritime 
Authority established that all national vessels greater than 20 Gross Tons must have a satellite- 
monitoring device; within the Galapagos Marine Reserve this should be extended to vessels 
smaller than 20 tons which venture further than the bay areas. The vessel owner pays for both 
the equipment and the monitoring service. There are currently five service providers that, after 
technical qualification from the Maritime Authority, compete on a free market. The equipment 
costs range from US$1,200 and US$1800, whereas the service ranges from US$56 and US$70 
per month. For smaller vessels the following two options exist: an extension of the VMS or the 
installation of Automatic Identification System (AIS), which does not have a recurrent cost. The 
implementation of the monitoring system for vessels smaller than 20 tons in the GMR has yet to 
occur, and although the regulatory framework was created in December 2007, the operational 
details, and economic and technical aspects are still being defined. 
It is expected that the next phase will constitute a hybrid system between VMS and AIS to cover:
VMS: Extensive areas, remote and with slow vessels.• 
AIS: Coastal zones, port arrival, transit routes and high speed vessels.• 
Settlement proximity and multiple uses of the MPA
There are four settlements within the GMR:
Puerto Baquerizo: 7,211 inhab.• 
Puerto Ayora: 14,886 inhab.• 
Puerto Villamil: 2,117 inhab.• 
Puerto Velasco Ibarra: 120 inhab.• 
Source: Ecuadorian Institute for Censuses and Statistics – INEC. Projected for 2009.
Figura 11: Satellite Monitoring System image. PNG 2009
Proximity to Maritime Traffic Routes
The GMR is not in the path of international marine traffic routes, but there is a permanent presence of 
industrial fishing vessels, cargo boats (at the time of writing this report there were seven ships which 
supplied the islands), and tourism vessels transiting between visitor sites. In 2005, the IMO declared 
the GMR a Particularly Sensitive Sea Area (PSSA). As a result, the Maritime Authority was obliged to 
create entry and exit routes, and to strictly regulate (and even prohibit) the transit of vessels requiring 
the right of innocent passage. This has not been formally implemented, giving rise to violations and 
offences which go unpunished while the regulations are still pending. Our opinion is that the GMR 
should have only one entry and exit point and that all “innocent passage” should be prohibited. As a 
result, we were made aware that right of innocent passage is often required by vessels from the tuna 
fleet when they are pursuing a school of fish, or when they have planned to deploy a fish aggregating 
device (FAD), so the transit in reality is part of a highly efficient mechanized fishing operation.
Surveillance Organization and Planning
The GNP does not have an established formal system of gathering intelligence, rather it relies on 
circumstantial and casual informers. Operations planning is more empirical than technical. However, 
the Coastguard (which possess an oceanic patrol boat, a coastal patrol boat and four speed boats) 
carries out its surveillance under Navy protocols. Joint operations have been strengthened but there 
are still no common protocols or procedures. It is clear that resources are often underestimated or 
underutilized, as is the case when the Navy designates an exploration hydroplane, or when the GNP 
deploys its plane. Put simply, inter-institutional coordination is still insufficient.
Capacity to Cover Area of Interest
Patrol operations within the GMR have sufficient vessels, especially when the coastguard vessels 
assigned to the region are included. Zoning has also permitted a certain amount of local autonomy 
in the technical offices of the GNP (Puerto Baquerizo, Puerto Villamil, Canal Bolívar Base, Tiburón 
Martillo floating base and Puerto Velasco.
Analysis of Contacts
The crews and personnel at the control center evaluate the movements of suspicious vessels 
according to their positions over time, direction, speed and positions between vessels 
(sometimes violations are committed by several vessels working together). This analysis of 
positions, direction and speeds permits the authorities to determine whether the vessel is 
fishing, undertaking a maneuver (receiving or handing over cargo) or simply transiting. All 
crew members are IMO accredited by the Maritime Authority to undertake operations at sea. 
Cargo vessels are also scrutinized to confirm the safety of their route and in the case of tour 
vessels: transit, itinerary and time spent at visitor sites are all verified. The level of operation 
and training for these aspects is acceptable but there are no refresher courses or evaluation 
periods to ensure that standards are maintained or to incorporate new forms of analysis.
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Vessels Used by Violators and Types of Operation
Type of violation depends on the vessel and the activity. The following matrix summarizes these 
in detail:
Vessel Type and  
Violation / Offence
Mode of Operation
Industrial fishing:
Illegal fishing• 
Medium speed vessels (12 to 15 knots) which may have onboard helicopters, fish aggregating devices, remote 
oceanographic and atmospheric sensors. Between 150 and 1500 tonnes cargo space. The tuna fleet falls into 
this category.
They enter at night or request right of innocent passage. They deploy fish aggregating devices (FADs) with 
remote monitoring systems and then return to set their gear.
Semi-industrial vessels
Illegal fishing• 
Trafficking of species• 
Drug trafficking• 
Fuel smuggling• 
Trafficking of people• 
Vessels from 20 to 150 tonnes which operate at low speeds but with autonomy of up to 15 days. Low 
technology.
They use longline or seines or take small outboard motorized vessels to make the fishing operation more 
effective. When using boats they come near the GMR and send the boats into the protected area to fish, 
because these are more difficult to detect, while the main vessel acts as a mother boat outside the limits of 
the marine reserve.
These are also the boats favored by drug and people traffickers in transit to northern countries. They operate by 
circling the GMR to the south and receiving local support in the sector around southeast Isabela. Local inhabitants 
bring water, fuel and supplies in their fiberglass boats and sell them to the smugglers. Coordination between the 
smugglers and the locals is done via satellite phone.
Another form of operation is to receive illegal fish catches or protected species which have been fished by local 
persons and stored in the urban or rural zone. The boat comes to the limit of the marine reserve and coordinates 
via satellite phone with the local fiberglass vessel transporting the illegal shipment from port.
Artisanal vessels
Illegal fishing • 
Species trafficking• 
Logistical support for traffickers• 
These are speedboats smaller than 7.5 meters length which leave secretly from port and fish illegally under 
request from traffickers or intermediaries. 
They return to port at night and land their catch for pre-processing in urban or rural areas. They can be detected 
from the amount of luxury spending they carry out in a relatively small society. 
In extreme cases, there are artisanal vessels which leave from Puerto Baquerizo and sail to Manta to hand over 
their illegal catch.
Transport vessels
Unauthorized tourist activities• 
These are vessels of up to 16 passengers which usually transport people between islands
They occasionally offer tourist services to visitors although they are not licensed to do so and do not fulfill the 
minimum safety or service quality requirements.
Tourism vessels
Unauthorized tourist activities • 
Species introduction• 
These are vessels which legally provide cruises or day tours in accordance with current regulations. However, 
in aspects of biosecurity or prevention/contingency control, the system is vulnerable and there are one to three 
accidents each year.
Due to their illumination, these vessels are vectors used by insects to spread between islands. 
Cargo vessels
Species introduction• 
Risk of pollution• 
Trafficking of species• 
Drug trafficking• 
Trafficking of people• 
There are seven vessels which provide a cargo service between the continent and Galapagos. This activity 
has very few regulations and those which do exist are not followed. They are not being regulated for issues of 
biosecurity. 
They are mostly (except two) obsolete ships which have ended their expected life span and should not be enter-
ing a fragile zone under these conditions. There is a high risk of shipwreck, strandings and oil spills.
This is a method used by illegal immigrants to enter the islands. It is also used to enter drugs and export ship-
ments of protected species (sea cucumbers, shark fins, lobster etc).
Table 41: Illegal Activities and Violations in the GMR.
Offenders dedicated to the trafficking of species, drugs or fuel smuggling, use local people for a 
variety of purposes. All these illegal activities are planned in the inhabited zones, where the products 
to be smuggled are often stored. It is important to note that the smugglers provide advance cash 
to their collaborators, to ensure their commitment. The Environmental Police (UPMA) operates in 
coordination with the GNP to counteract these offences.
Level of Involvement of the Population
Galapagos possesses a new immigrant population whose main objective is to secure a financial 
future or make the most of any opportunity (there is no sense of “belonging” to the place where they 
live). The original local population, which had assimilated to the surroundings and developed a culture 
of respect towards the islands, no longer has the influence it once had. Economic gain, rather than 
respect and promotion of conservation or management of protected areas, motivates present day 
Galapagos society. There is also a sense of solidarity among the local population. In such a small 
society it is obvious who is committing illegal activities yet, due to close-knit relationships, no one 
collaborates with the authorities. There are no voluntary reports and, generally, the community will 
support an offender even to the point of confronting authorities. 
Detection Probability
The case of the GMR is complex due to its vast area, the great distances to sites, and the 
resulting reduced onsite patrol time. Additionally, offenders use smaller vessels, which reduce 
the maximum effective detection distance (sweep width). Under this scenario, we analyzed 
two of the most critical areas:
Zones 1-6:18,914.41 nm• 2 (North, North-East Sectors)
Zone 3: 3,509.38 nm• 2 (SouthWest Sector).
By applying the equation to a range of variables for both the exploration distance (which is equal 
to the time spent onsite, using a reference of a standard patrolling velocity of 10 knots) and the 
Maximum Effective Detection Distance (which represents different sized contacts or visual/radar 
detection means), we obtain the following relationships:
Table 42: Detection Probability, P (det) ZONE 1-6, with a patrol boat
Maximum Effective Detection Distance (nm)
                 Maximum Effective Detection Distance nm
 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
130 4.04% 5.35% 6.64% 7.92% 9.17% 10.41% 11.64% 12.84%
140 4.34% 5.75% 7.13% 8.50% 9.84% 11.17% 12.47% 13.76%
150 4.65% 6.15% 7.62% 9.08% 10.51% 11.92% 13.30% 14.67%
160 4.95% 6.54% 8.11% 9.65% 11.17% 12.66% 14.12% 15.56%
170 5.25% 6.94% 8.60% 10.22% 11.82% 13.39% 14.94% 16.45%
180 5.55% 7.33% 9.08% 10.79% 12.47% 14.12% 15.74% 17.33%
190 5.85% 7.72% 9.56% 11.36% 13.12% 14.85% 16.54% 18.20%
200 6.15% 8.11% 10.03% 11.92% 13.76% 15.56% 17.33% 19.06%
210 6.44% 8.50% 10.51% 12.47% 14.40% 16.28% 18.11% 19.91%
220 6.74% 8.89% 10.98% 13.03% 15.03% 16.98% 18.89% 20.76%
230 7.04% 9.27% 11.45% 13.58% 15.65% 17.68% 19.66% 21.59%
240 7.33% 9.65% 11.92% 14.12% 16.28% 18.37% 20.42% 22.41%Di
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The calculation analyzed a distance of between 130 and 240 Nm (approximately 13 to 24 hours 
onsite), and in the best of cases, P (det) is 22.41%, when the vessel has covered 240 Nm and the 
maximum detection distance is 20 Nm (radar).
Analysis: Zone 1 – 6 is remote and vast.The GNP vessels which patrol the zone take 6 to 7 hours 
to reach the appropriate site to begin exploration, and they must leave the site with enough time to 
reach their home ports. The effective time onsite (patrol time) is significantly reduced. Surveillance in 
this zone is complicated and inefficient. They should coordinate with the Coastguard and implement 
electronic surveillance (Radar+VMS+AIS) to improve the indicator, but in any case this zone will 
remain a vulnerable area.
Under the same procedures, we analyzed the difference if the airplane is used in exploration (the 
GNP “Sea Wolf”). We kept the same maximum detection distances but observe how the distance 
covered per unit of time is much greater.
Analysis: By using the plane, the same P(det) is achieved in two hours as a patrol boat achieves in 
over 24 hours. Unfortunately, the plane has a reduced maximum patrol time of only 4 hours.
Nonetheless, the probability of detecting a contact with the airplane is still low (less than 35%-25%). 
The cost-efficiency ratio of patrolling this area of the GMR is very difficult to optimize so any plan that 
is developed must always balance the combined use of these resources to minimize waste. In order 
to improve surveillance, we recommend using autonomous AIS sensors at Pinta, Genovesa and on 
board the floating base “Tiburon Martillo.” In addition, coordination could be improved between the 
GNP and coastguard vessels so that patrol boats can remain onsite as long as possible. 
Table 43: Detection Probability, P (det) ZONE 1-6, with airplane
Zones 1—6
                 Maximum Effective Detection Distance nm
 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
120, 1 h 3.74% 4.95% 6.15% 7.33% 8.50% 9.65% 10.79% 11.92%
150 4.65% 6.15% 7.62% 9.08% 10.51% 11.92% 13.30% 14.67%
180 5.55% 7.33% 9.08% 10.79% 12.47% 14.12% 15.74% 17.33%
210 6.44% 8.50% 10.51% 12.47% 14.40% 16.28% 18.11% 19.91%
240, 2 h 7.33% 9.65% 11.92% 14.12% 16.28% 18.37% 20.42% 22.41%
270 8.21% 10.79% 13.30% 15.74% 18.11% 20.42% 22.66% 24.84%
300 9.08% 11.92% 14.67% 17.33% 19.91% 22.41% 24.84% 27.18%
330 9.94% 13.03% 16.01% 18.89% 21.67% 24.36% 26.95% 29.46%
360, 3 h 10.79% 14.12% 17.33% 20.42% 23.39% 26.25% 29.01% 31.66%
390 11.64% 15.21% 18.63% 21.92% 25.07% 28.10% 31.01% 33.79%
420 12.47% 16.28% 19.91% 23.39% 26.72% 29.90% 32.95% 35.86%
450 13.30% 17.33% 21.17% 24.84% 28.33% 31.66% 34.83% 37.86%Di
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The GNP airplane “Sea Wolf”, despite being relatively new, has serious maintenance issues and 
is out of service for long periods of time (over a year at the time of preparing this report). The GNP 
added the plane without establishing an internal support structure and now, three or four years after 
acquisition, it spends long periods of time inoperative. As a result, the benefit of having an airplane is 
lost if the institution does not have the capacity to support it; poor maintenance means that it spends 
most of the time sitting in a hanger. 
P (det) is greatly improved in smaller areas as can be observed from the following calculation for 
ZONE 3 using a patrol boat which covers 30 to 140 nautical miles in the sector (3 to 14 hours onsite):
Analysis: Patrols in smaller areas of the GMR do present acceptable Detection Probabilities. 
However, these values are only real while the vessel is onsite and as we mentioned earlier, the 
availability indices are critically low, so the capability for surveillance tends towards zero.
The presence of the Base at Canal Bolivar ensures a permanent surveillance of the western 
coastal area of the GMR, which generates a similar result to that of the northern sector. This 
base does not have exploration sensors, so we recommend installing a radar or AIS receiver. 
Finally, the calculated results assume a random search within the area of interest, but as soon 
as the vessel is provided intelligence or a search pattern is developed at Operations Control (as 
is the case with VMS control), the probability of detection rises dramatically. It is for this reason 
that we stress the importance of strengthening combined patrols, maintenance improvement, 
use of sensors and intelligence-gathering technology, and mutual support between GNP and 
coastguard vessels.
Table 44: Detection Probability, P (det) ZONE 3, with Patrol Vessel
Zone 3
                 Maximum Effective Detection Distance nm
22.62%  6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
30 5.00% 6.61% 8.19% 9.75% 11.28% 12.78% 14.26% 15.72%
40 6.61% 8.72% 10.77% 12.78% 14.75% 16.67% 18.55% 20.38%
50 8.19% 10.77% 13.28% 15.72% 18.08% 20.38% 22.62% 24.79%
60 9.75% 12.78% 15.72% 18.55% 21.29% 23.93% 26.49% 28.96%
70 11.28% 14.75% 18.08% 21.29% 24.37% 27.32% 30.17% 32.90%
80 12.78% 16.67% 20.38% 23.93% 27.32% 30.56% 33.66% 36.61%
90 14.26% 18.55% 22.62% 26.49% 30.17% 33.66% 36.97% 40.12%
100 15.72% 20.38% 24.79% 28.96% 32.90% 36.61% 40.12% 43.44%
110 17.14% 22.18% 26.91% 31.35% 35.52% 39.44% 43.12% 46.57%
120 18.55% 23.93% 28.96% 33.66% 38.04% 42.14% 45.96% 49.53%
130 19.93% 25.65% 30.96% 35.89% 40.47% 44.72% 48.66% 52.33%
140 21.29% 27.32% 32.90% 38.04% 42.79% 47.18% 51.23% 54.97%Di
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Interception and Arrest
The patrol vessels have sufficient speed and autonomy to carry out their work. They can all go 
faster than 20 knots and the autonomy of oceanic vessels is greater than four days. The GNP has 
an established marine base and, for this reason, interventions routinely comply with procedures. 
However, there are no established training programs. In 2008, there were 337 patrols, far more 
than other marine operations undertaken (a total of 460).
1,782 days were spent patrolling, which is an average of 5.29 days of patrolling for each operation. 
This is an acceptable figure in terms of detection optimization, interception, and detention in the 
sub-areas. There is 100% efficiency in terms of vessels sighted and those inspected, as the following 
graph shows:
1,079 vessels were inspected of which eight were detained. None of the interception attempts failed. 
308 violations were reported during the year.
The GNP does not have a standardized training procedure for boarding vessels. The occasional 
training course has been given, but constant crew rotations (crew were not core staff until the 
present year) caused the knowledge to be lost over time. The job instability faced by crew also 
meant that it was not worth investing in training as their employment was only assured for one 
year. Currently, all temporary staff have been made permanent, but this is not enough to fill all 
positions. There are still no standardized protocol or training programs that ensure operational 
efficiency. These aspects require immediate attention because, in recent months, drug smuggling 
boats have been detected. Boarding these vessels is a high-risk action which requires better 
personal protection equipment and safe interception procedures.
All boarding procedures are carried out in the presence of a Coastguard official, who has the 
legal power to make arrests. Park Wardens do not. Coastguard crews also suffer from the lack of 
familiarity with the boarding procedures. A handbook is envisaged which will provide instructions 
for boardings, inspections, collection and handling of evidence, crime scene investigation and 
intervention reports.
Figure 12: Type of marine operation in the GMR, 2008
Logistics 
Control / Surveillance
Research
Fisheries Monitoring
Vessels Used
Total Days
Total Number Operations
Vessels Detained
Total Number of Camps
Number Vessels Inspected
Number Vessels Escaped
Total Violations
Total Detentions
Figure 13: Surveillance and Control Indicators
Prosecution
In 2008, the main violations detected were the following:
It must be emphasized that in 2008 and the first half of 2009 there have been six accidents involving 
tour vessels or vessels of other types which have presented an imminent environmental and safety 
risk. The table below outlines the cases opened by the GNP between 2002 and 2009.
Type of Violation Quantity (2008)
Industrial fishing 2
Unauthorized entry 13
Vessel without fishing permit 3
Fisher without license (PARMA) 46
Fishing in closed areas 17
Fishing in closed seasons 1
Fishing of protected species 8
Illegal camps 1
Obstruction of Park Warden duties 3
Others: 
Tourist vessels (change of itinerary, unauthorized activities)• 
Cargo, fuel and transport vessels which entry prohibited areas, discharge • 
of sewage
Expired licenses or patents due to non-operation/sale of resources out • 
of season
212
TOTAL 306
Table 45: Principal violations 2008
General Summary
Year Number of Cases 
Opened
Number of Cases 
Resolved
Number of Cases 
Pending
Percentage of  
Unresolved Cases
2002 87 81 6 6.89%
2003 119 100 19 15.96%
2004 106 94 12 11.32%
2005 95 74 19 20.0%
2006 129 112 17 13.17%
2007 338 289 49 14.49%
2008 134 60 57 42.53%
2009 104 65 48 46.15% (*)
Table 46: Principal violations 2009 (*) to date, the fiscal year has not ended
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A “resolved case” does not necessarily mean that the result has been favorable to the Environmental 
Authority, but simply that judgement was passed and the case concluded. As we will see in the next 
section, this detail greatly changes the efficiency indicators of the processing stage. 
The processing indicators are not satisfactory, and this corresponds to the fact that in 2007 and 
2008 there was a massive screening of the fishing register. Various NGOs have opted to provide 
legal assistance to the GNP with additional lawyers to strengthen the legal team. When there are 
no procedural defences (internal and external), administrative processes should not take more 
than 2 months. However, judicial processes are neither fast nor effective. Many cases take years 
to be resolved, and in most cases do not favor the plaintiff. The Environmental Authority drives 
and monitors the legal processes, and participates by presenting the accusations and providing 
evidence of the violations committed. In administrative processes there are often cases of 
mistaken identity as the offenders commonly do not carry identification documents. A system to 
measure the accumulation of violations is necessary; this is a flaw that dates back to the LOREG. 
This is needed so that harsher sanctions can be imposed on recurrent offenders, culminating in 
the loss of the privileges established for those carrying patents, permits, or licenses. 
Sanctions and Sentencing
In administrative cases, the percentage of sanctions is close to 100% in favor of the GNP, although 
this does not necessarily imply the success of all the processes against violators – GNP processes 
are not fast enough and several cases have been lost or misplaced. Sanction time is between 2 and 
24 months, and the percentage of sentences in favor of the Environmental Authority is 56% (taking 
as a sample the screening process of the fisheries register in 2007). 
These figures are not a good indicator for an activity that is completely under the jurisdiction of the 
GNP, and there are certain aspects which must be highlighted:
5% of administrative cases have not been resolved for over 2 years. This is unacceptable given • 
that these are purely internal processes.
32% of cases were lost resulting from either poor evidence collection, incorrectly following a • 
procedure, or lack of transparency.
2007
Cases Resolved Cases Lost Appeals Delays
63 35 5 6
Table 47: Administrative Cases in 2007 corresponding to the Screening Process of the Fishing Register
The following figure summarizes Table 47:
Judicial processes are a much larger problem due to several critical points:
All the administrative systems are manual and obsolete.• 
Discrepancies between the Maritime Authority and the Environmental Authority.• 
Lack of inter-institutional cooperation with the GNP (several projects have been created to • 
support local judicial functioning, but these have not been implemented. For instance, the 
creation of judicial mailboxes were handed out two years ago but never installed).
Precarious funding for judicial staff.• 
Lack of knowledge of environmental law.• 
Corruption.• 
Cases are taken outside the Province of Galapagos to Guayaqui.• 
In the case of judicial processes, authorities need to modernize the system. Processes are 
outdated and updating is unjustifiably prevented. This would be of great benefit given the time 
taken for documents to travel between islands or to the continent. 
Figure 14: 2007 Administrative Cases corresponding to the Fishing Register 
Screening Process
Cases Resolved
Cases Lost
Appeals
Delayed
Efficiency of Administrative Processes  
(Fishing Register Screening Process) 2007
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Recommendations
Galapagos Islands, Ecuador
Surveillance and Detection 
Critical Aspect Excessive size of artisanal fishing fleet and number of 
fishers. 
Recommendation Screen the fishing register in accordance with fishing 
capacity and whether fishers remain in the activity. 
Initial phase complete.
Feasibility High. Only requires a technical decision by the GNP 
and NGOs will be able to cooperate. After the screening 
process, subsidies and focalized incentives can be fixed.
Estimated Cost US$25,000. 
Critical Aspect Illegal entry of industrial vessels under different 
mechanisms:  
•	Innocent passage. 
•	Entry	of	smaller	boats	from	outside	the	GMR	limits. 
•	Use	of	local	pangas.
Recommendation 1) Apply IMO rules for right of innocent passage, and 
those pertaining to the Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas.  
2) Focus patrols along the borders of the GMR in mutual 
collaboration with the Coastguard Service. 
Feasibility Medium. Requires lobbying the Marine Authority for the 
implementation of this IMO requirement.
Estimated Cost US$15,000 for technical assistance and meeting 
coordination.
Critical Aspect Growth of the number of vessels dedicated to tourism 
without a corresponding increase in control capacity. 
No automated control of vessels smaller than 20  
Extensive area to patrol.
Recommendation 1) Apply technology to control: VMS and AIS. Automate 
itinerary control. 
2) Add vessels smaller than 20 tons to the electronic 
AIS-VMS control system.  
3) Put in place a mechanism of corrective actions for 
irregularities or bad practices.
Feasibility Medium. Requires enormous political commitment and 
technical ability.  
If achieved, political will would be backed by other 
national, international, private and state institutions.
Estimated Cost US$350,000 for technical assistance and implemen-
tation of an automated control system, operational 
regulations (complementary norms), quality control 
system, technical personnel and inspector qualification 
and training, and an inspection system.
Surveillance and Detection (cont.) 
Critical Aspect No onboard and dry dock maintenance plans.
Recommendation 1) Design and implement onboard and dry dock 
maintenance plans: logbooks, records templates, 
weekly status reports. 
2) Change purchasing system. 
3) Hire the following permanent staff: Head of 
Maintenance with ISM qualifications, electrician/ 
welder, naval engine technician. 
4) Continuous personnel training.
Feasibility 1) Medium. 
2) Low. 
3) Low due to the existence of limited salary caps.  
4) High.
Estimated Cost 1) US$50,000 for technical assistance one the GNP has 
hired a Head of Maintenance. 
2)US$15,000. 
3)US$60,000 per year. 
4) US$30,000.
Critical Aspect Optimization of the number of vessels and crew sizes.
Recommendation 1) Implement electronic surveillance methods. 
2) Reduce vessel patrolling activities. 
3) Optimize donations.
Feasibility 1) High. 
2) Medium. 
3) Medium. 
Estimated Cost US$50,000.
Critical Aspect Trafficking of species and illegal fishing.
Recommendation 1) Inspect cargo vessels prior to sailing using 
sniffer dogs. 
2) Establish a group of private investigators to obtain 
information about illegal activities.
Feasibility 1) Medium. Requires political will from stakeholders. 
UPMA and Navy. 
2) High. Depends on external financing.
Estimated Cost 1) US$25,000 for technical assistance and implemen-
tation of inter-institutional intervention procedures. 
2) US$25,000.
Critical Aspect Administrative and Judicial processes take too long.
Recommendation Add 1 or 2 lawyers. Support through NGOs with 
external lawyers as private plaintiffs.
Feasibility Medium. Requires political will on behalf of the GNP and 
Ministry of Environment.
Estimated Cost US$60,000 per year.
Critical Aspect Cases of flagrant impunity by exclusively judicial 
decisions.
Recommendation Publicize cases in the press.
Feasibility High.
Estimated Cost US$5,000 per year.
Critical Aspect High proportion of administrative cases lost (32%).
Recommendation Add 1 or 2 lawyers. Review and correct the procedure to 
open new cases. 
Establish a procedure to monitor cases on a quarterly 
basis with technical assistance from NGOs.
Feasibility Medium. Requires political will on behalf of the GNP 
and Ministry of Environment.
Currently, there is already one lawyer assigned by 
the NGOs, but external legal support is required for 
monitoring cases.
Estimated Cost Included in the previous cost.
Interception and Arrest
Critical Aspect Institutional interference in the setting of regulations.
Recommendation 1) Correct flaws in marine environmental law (new 
Galapagos Special Law) and specify roles and 
competencies of those involved. 
2) Develop joint operational procedures between 
institutions.
Feasibility Medium. Delegates from the institutions involved 
should be included.
Estimated Cost US$25,000. Included in the operational costs of the 
institutions and NGOs involved.
Critical Aspect No boarding procedures and no refresher training for 
personnel.
Recommendation 1) Establish a boarding procedure (Navy-GNP- 
Environmental Police).  
2) Annual training course for boarding procedures 
and crime scene investigation Navy-GNP- 
Environmental Police).
Feasibility 1) High. 
2) High.
Estimated Cost 1) US$10,000. 
2) US$15,000.
Critical Aspect Lack of knowledge of environmental legislation on 
behalf of the judges.
Recommendation Encourage annual workshops attended by Port  
Authorities, Judges and GNP, to review procedures. 
Feasibility High.
Estimated Cost US$10,000 to support seminars, or evaluation and 
training workshops.
Critical Aspect Institutional interference in the arrest and processing 
(Navy-GNP). 
Initialization of legal proceedings lacks coherence.
Recommendation Review operational procedures of both institutions by 
means of a semester efficiency evaluation. 
Feasibility High. Operational evaluation meeting should be  
organized between both institutions on a regular basis.
Estimated Cost US$20,000 to ensure that the first meetings take place.
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Conclusions
Summary of Regional Actions 
The Eastern Tropical Pacific is a region of high biodiversity, biological productivity and ecosystem 
connectivity. Much of its wildlife is endemic and/or threatened. The five MPAs share more than their 
biodiversity and oceanographic and ecological connectivity – they also share problems and threats, 
such as illegal fishing, poorly regulated tourism and vessel-based pollution among others. Some 
of the stakeholders from the four countries fish in the Seascape waters regardless of national 
jurisdiction. Often a vessel committing a violation in one MPA belongs to one of the other three 
countries of the region.
All the MPAs also share a poor level of enforcement of the laws and regulations. This publication 
analyzed the weaknesses in the law enforcement chain and found problems with the capacity 
to detect and intercept offenders, poor preparation for effective legal cases, difficulties in both 
administrative and judicial processes, and finally, obstacles which prevent sanctions from being 
imposed upon violators. The laws that protect the MPAs of the Seascape are only as good as 
their implementation and enforcement.
The following table summarizes the law enforcement problems encountered by each country in the 
Seascape. However, if the country does not appear in the list, this does not necessarily mean that 
the problem does not exist in its MPA. We observed that the same problems tend to occur in one 
form or another in each of the MPAs.
Common Problems
Problem Recommendation Country Where  
Problem is Observed
Uncontrolled population growth. Improve migration control. Ecuador
Tourism activities by  
unlicensed vessels.
Improve coordination between Ministry of Tourism and MPA Authorities. Ecuador 
Gorgona, Colombia 
Panama 
Costa Rica
Lack of awareness of MPA 
regulations in neighboring 
communities.
Awareness campaigns in coordination with NGOs and MPAs. Ecuador 
Colombia 
Panama
Excessive artisanal fleet size. Screen the fishing register.
Reduce fleet size.
Ecuador
Lack of bio-security  
regulations.
Establish procedures for inspections and quarantines. Ecuador 
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Panama
Park Warden salaries not 
competitive.
Raise salaries and budget or improve per diems. Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Panama
Lack of MPA personnel and no 
job profiles upon which to base 
appointments,
Increase budget to hire new personnel.
Create job profiles for these staff.
Produce a Park Wardens Handbook.
Increase Park Warden level of training.
Create a Regional School for Park Wardens.
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Panama 
Costa Rica
Common Problems (cont.)
Problem Recommendation Country Where  
Problem is Observed
High personnel rotation, 
especially in Navy.
More frequent training for new personnel.
Incentives to encourage personnel stabilization at MPAs.
Colombia 
Ecuador
MPA income goes to general 
state treasury and not to MPA.
Lack of operational funds.
Encourage decentralization of MPAs.
Reorganize MPA financial systems so that income generated remains  
at MPA.
Develop fundraising programs. 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Panama 
Colombia
Poor communication between 
MPA personnel and central 
headquarters.
Obtain better communications equipment, Costa Rica 
Colombia
Poor violation detection rate Incorporate onboard or land based radar.
Obtain more vessels and faster vessels.
Increase number of park wardens.
Form strategic alliance with NGO, e.g. MarViva.
Adopt an electronic vessel monitoring system.
Improve coordination between MPA authorities and Navy/Coastguard/Police. 
Costa Rica 
Colombia 
Ecuador 
Panama
Tuna vessels enter MPAs. Adopt an electronic monitoring system.
Strengthen patrols.
Carry out inspections prior to sailing.
Improve coordination between MPA and Police/Navy.
Establish buffer zones around MPA.
Share maritime information (vessel registers, navigation routes, vessel 
detention) among Authorities of the four countries.
Strengthen sanctions to prevent return to the MPA.
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Panama
Lack of control of shark 
finning.
Review fisheries regulations. Costa Rica 
Colombia 
Panama 
Ecuador
Lack of vessel maintenance Provide training in vessel and motor maintenance.
Increase budget for vessel maintenance.
Implement external technical assistance.
Costa Rica 
Ecuador 
Panama 
Colombia
Lack of an appropriate register 
of interventions at each link 
of the law enforcement chain 
(patrols, detection, interception, 
arrest, prosecution, sentences).
Design protocols for interventions.
Maintain an electronic up-to-date record of violations.
Ecuador 
Panama 
Colombia
Impunity of offenders.
Slow processes.
Interference from the govern-
ment and institutions in the 
legal process.
Hire more lawyers.
Review procedures.
Form alliances with NGOs for legal assistance.
In administrative cases, confiscate and destroy fishing gear.
Restrict port exit for violators.
Detain vessels which have committed violations, and revoke their fishing and 
navigation permits.
Improve coordination between institutions.
Improve press relations so that cases are publicized.
Colombia 
Costa Rica 
Panama 
Ecuador
Conflicts of interest between 
the Fisheries Authority-Fishing 
Industry and the Environmental 
Authority.
Reconstitute the Fisheries Authority Executive Board/Board of Directors. Costa Rica 
Panama 
Colombia
This table shows the problems common to all the 
Seascape MPAs and the need for strategic actions 
to be taken. Changes may be done on a national 
level, although they may be more effective if applied 
from a regional perspective.
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Recommendations
Summary of Regional Activities 
Critical Aspect Insufficient Personnnel.
Recommendation Complement personnel with Coastguards or  
Environmental Police depending on the case.
Feasibility Low. Dependent on other institutions which are out 
of reach.
We sug gest attempting this for Coiba.
Estimated Cost US$75,000 to obtain agreements.
Critical Aspect Institutional Weakness
•	Lack	of	records	and	documentation	related	to	
interventions.
•	Low	vessel	availability.
•	Limited	maintenance	capacity.
•	Inefficient	logistics	and	purchasing	processes.
Recommendation 1) Produce operating and structural manuals according 
to the mission of the MPA.
2) Establish procedures to document activities, record 
and store information.
3) Train at least one member of staff in basic 
maintenance: design and implementation of 
maintenance plans.
4) Evaluate the current capacity of the maintenance 
shop and define minimum required equipmen.
5) Generate support projects which subcontract vessel 
maintenance in the medium term:
	•	Create	a	fund	to	purchase	critical	spare	parts	which	
is managed by an NGO or external agency.
	•	Provide	direct	technical	assistance	by	means	of	a	
specialized professional.
Feasibility High. There is interest in all MPAs to generate processes 
which improve their management.
The solutions do not require large investments but 
need a decision from the Directors of the MPAs to 
implement the recommendations.
Estimated Cost 1) US$120,000 for improved administration.
2) US$40,000 for personnel training.
3) US$60,000 to create a computer program to manage 
field records.
4) US$200,000 to create a fund for spare parts. Would 
cover needs for two years.
5) US$100,000 to hire a naval engine specialist in each 
MPA.
Surveillance and Detection
Critical Aspect Lack of political will to prioritize conservation and 
sustainable development.
Recommendation Regional meeting of Ministers and Directors of 
Protected Areas to present results and establish 
mechanisms to strengthen each link in each country 
and encourage regional cooperation.
Feasibility High. The initial contacts have been made.
Estimated Cost US$70,000.
Critical Aspect Limited MPA financial autonomy.
Recommendation 1) Create a local fund using money paid by visitors to 
the MPAs.
2) Allow the Director of each MPA access to this fund for 
urgent operational aspects.
Feasibility 1) Low. There is a predominant interest to transfer all 
funds to the state treasury.
2) A pilot project could be proposed via NGOs for specific 
actions such as field supplies or spare parts. Some kind 
of co-management for the MPA between an NGO and 
the State could be considered (following the example 
of Belize).
Estimated Cost US $ 75,000. We recommend applying this to two 
MPAs, for example Coiba and Cocos.
Critical Aspect Local Communities do not identify with MPA 
management.
Recommendation 1) Develop programs within the communities so that 
they can improve their sense of ownership of the MPA 
and the benefits it may generate.
2) Work with a university or NGO in order to provide 
education for the community.
Feasibility Medium. This is a long-term process of at least 5 years 
to generate a change. We suggest starting in one 
specific area such as Gorgona or Coiba.
Estimated Cost US $125,000 + local counterpart.
Critical Aspect Low salaries for Park Wardens.
Recommendation Analyze the possibility of providing per diem in the field 
or when Park Wardens are on patrol.
Feasibility Medium. Political will could be generated but this is a 
timely process.
The situation is more critical in Panama and Colombia
Estimated Cost US $40,000 for one year.
Surveillance and Detection (cont.) 
Critical Aspect Park Warden level of competence is very low, training is 
sporadic or non-existent
•	Regulatory	Framework.
•	MPA	Management.
•	Administrative	support	activities.
•	Survival	and	damage/fire	control.
•	Operation	planning.
•	Operation	execution.
Coastguards with gaps in knowledge of marine 
environmental management and management of marine 
resources.
Recommendation 1) Prepare a syllabus of basic management aspects 
which can serve as regional training.
2) Prepare complementary syllabus for more 
specialized activities (field operations, research, 
interception, monitoring).
3) Propose a basic training syllabus for Park Wardens on 
marine environmental issues.
4) Create a Regional Park Warden School which should 
bring together the academic sector with conservation, 
marine and environmental authorities. This does not have 
to be a physical space because available infrastructure 
at Universities or National Parks should be used, and 
regular courses for Park Wardens throughout the region 
should be held, to ensure a critical mass of attendance.
Feasibility High. There is great interest in this possibility.
Estimated Cost 1) US$50,000 to design the basic and advanced 
syllabus and achieve an agreement with a regional 
university.
2) US$120,000 for “in country” courses.
3) US$120,000 + counterpart for a regional course.
Critical Aspect Introduction of invasive species to the endemic habitats 
of these areas.
Lack of rules and procedures relating to biosecurity or 
quarantines upon ship arrival.
Recommendation Quarantine procedures and inspection/fumigation 
mechanisms should be implemented along with hull 
cleaning and interior cleaning before arrival. Requires 
minor regulatory modifications.
Feasibility High. Does not require a large capital investment – 
mainly procedures. 
Benefit is immediate.
Estimated Cost US $250,000.
Surveillance and Detection (cont.) 
Critical Aspect Limited detection capacity (especially for smaller 
vessels).
Smaller vessels are the hardest to detect and the most 
commonly used for a variety of offences.
Growing tourism activity both on a local and a 
multinational scale.
MPAs do not have the infrastructure to cope with this 
growth rate.
Recommendation 1) Implement electronic surveillance:
•	Radar.
•	Monitoring	devices	(VMS	or	AIS).
2) Permit the Environmental Authority to share the use 
of these resources for other applications such as the 
control of areas and monitoring harvesting activities.
Feasibility High. The investment costs are absolutely reasonable in 
comparison to the value of the resources to be protected.
Requires prior training of MPA personnel.
Estimated Cost US$1,500,000 for all MPAs.
Critical Aspect Lack of basic surveillance and detection equipment:
•	Binoculars.
•	Speed	boats	(better	motors).
•	GPS.
•	Photo	and	video	cameras.
•	Radios.
•	Night	vision	equipment.
Recommendation Generate a list of requirements for each MPA.
Facilitate a donation or support from friendly  
governments, multilaterals or NGOs.
Feasibility High. All the MPAs would be interested in receiving 
this support.
Estimated Cost US $125,000
Critical Aspect No record, census or register of stakeholders, especially 
artisanal fishers.
Recommendation Create a register system for violations to improve future 
MPA management.
Feasibility High. All the MPAs require this instrument and do not 
have it yet.
Estimated Cost US $200,000 to create database.
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Critical Aspect Permanent pressure on MPA and EEZ resources by 
industrial fishers.
Recommendation 1) Enforcement goes further than the limits of the MPA, 
because of the freedom of which trans-national fishing 
vessels and tourism yachts can freely cross unguarded 
marine boundaries between countries. As the violations 
are initiated outside the MPAs, emphasis must be 
placed on law enforcement in the EEZs and MPAs in 
defense of the rights of the coastal nations.
2) Creation of buffer zones around MPAs.
3) Integrate electronic monitoring systems between the 
countries. Start with a regional workshop and continue 
with bilateral and multilateral agreements between 
Authorities.
Feasibility 1) Medium. Proposal must be lobbied in each country 
using the stakeholders in favor such as maritime 
authorities, coastguard, police, environmental authorities 
and affected communities.
2) Medium. The legal base needs to be worked on and 
then coordination with other State institutions.
3) High. The IMO is making this mandatory (see the LRIT 
regulations). 
Estimated Cost 1) US$80,000 for two years. 
2) US$60,000. 
3) US$60,000.
Interception and Arrest
Critical Aspect Lack of training in boarding procedures and crime 
scene investigation.
Recommendation Annual regional workshop to train and standardize 
protocols among the four countries.
Feasibility High. All the MPAs are interested in receiving this 
support.
Estimated Cost US$180,000 for three years.
Critical Aspect There is abundant local legislation on marine 
environmental issues and protection of MPAs, but it is 
confusing, overlapping, constantly transgressed and 
manipulated so as to avoid compliance, or does not 
correspond to the true problems and risks.
Recommendation 1) Implement regional regulations such as UNCLOS 
(applicable to Territorial Sea and EEZ for signatory 
countries) and Particularly Sensitive Sea Areas. 
2) Review current legislation and adapt jurisdictions of 
institutions or resolve gaps.
3) Establish joint intervention agreements where more 
than one institution acts. These agreements must be on 
an operational level.
4) Encourage states to declare their most important 
MPAs as World Heritage Sites or Particularly Sensitive 
Sea Areas.
5) Create a regional marine conservation management 
body to act as a counterpart to fishing guilds or 
multinational tour operators.
6) Give autonomous jurisdiction to MPAs so that they 
can act as first instance judges, or delegate a nearby 
authority which is closer to the operational level.
Feasibility Low. Requires political will, lobbying and eventually 
changes in Parliamentary Law.
However, the operational relationships between the 
following institutions should be strengthened:
•	Envinronmental	Authority.
•	Maritime	Authority.
•	Environmental	Police.
This would achieve a decisive momentum.
These relations must be strengthened by means of 
detailed cooperation agreements..
Estimated Cost 1) US$240,000 for two years work in the four countries.
Sanctions
Critical Aspect Weak capacity for sanctions and compliance with 
judicial processes in all of the countries.
Recommendation Strengthen the position of the local environmental 
authority as the first instance judge for administrative 
cases.
Impose non-economic sanctions such as:
•	Detention	of	the	vessel	for	limited	periods.
•	Restrict	permits	to	leave	port.
•	Confiscate	fishing	gear.
•	Temporary	suspension	of	permits.
•	Revoke	licenses.
Feasibility Medium. Need to work on the political will of each 
country to get the administrative changes approved.
Estimated Cost US$80,000. This should take a maximum of two years 
to achieve.
Critical Aspect High level of cases lost and impunity.
Recommendation 1) Provide technical assistance to environmental 
authorities through legal aid and private external 
plaintiffs.
2) Annual training workshops for MPA lawyers and 
attorneys.
3) Public campaigns and media attention to denounce 
acts of impunity.
Feasibility 1) Medium. Proposal must be lobbied and support 
from authorities confirmed.
2) High. There is the will to do this in terms of training 
and Access to the District Attorney.
3) Medium.
Estimated Cost 1) US$160,000 for one year in all the countries. 
2) US$240,000 to fund two years of training in all 
four countries. 
3 ) US$200,000.
Sanctions (cont.)
Critical Aspect Impunity due to excessive time taken or pressures of 
other kinds.
Recommendation 1) Promote the application of administrative sanctions 
and minimize the intervention of judicial powers.
2) Assign more lawyers on behalf of NGOs or support 
agencies to monitor cases of marine violations and 
offences.
3) Organize private accusations in prominent cases 
using external attorneys.
Feasibility 1) Medium. Proposal must be lobbied and support from 
authorities obtained to generated the required changes 
in regulations.
2) High. There is interest in all MPAs.
3) Medium. Implies the risk of rejecting the position of 
the State.
Estimated Cost 1) US$160,000 for all the countries.
2) US$160,000 for all the countries.
3) US$120,000 for all the countries.
We hope that the information presented in this publication will lead to the adoption of strategic actions 
that can be implemented on both a regional and national level to mitigate the problems identified. The 
tables above outline the course of action that the four governments, and the NGOs which work in the 
Seascape, might take to address the most pressing problems. The specific actions we recommend 
are expected to improve law enforcement in the Seascape and thus improve the protection of its 
natural coastal and marine resources for generations to come.
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